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After a severe economic crisis, the Senegalese government was strongly 
committed to rebuilding an economy that was close to financial collapse. To restore 
economic growth and efficiency, Senegal implemented political and economic reforms to 
address the challenges of the social crises that endangered the nation’s stability. In fact, 
Senegal began to adopt stabilization and structural adjustment policies because of 
increasing debts and its inability to pay them. With the support of the World Bank and 
IMF, Senegal planned to solve the economic crisis through various measures such as the 
Agricultural Policy (NAP) and the New Industrial Policy (NIP). Despite all these efforts, 
the objectives of such reforms were not reached. In the early 1990s, the rate of economic 
growth was low and erratic, and poverty and unemployment increased. To restore growth 
and efficiency, Senegal devalued the CFA Franc (the local currency), and at the same 
time, several other measures were implemented to improve the economy. This thesis 
explores the reasons for the failure of the Senegalese economic reform process and 
proposes some solutions for improving the deployment of the Senegalese economy.  
This thesis examines how the informal sector has reacted to the economic 
reforms. Therefore, policies are proposed in this thesis to promote the informal sector. 
Facing difficulties, such as increased customs taxes, lack of money to finance banking 
guarantees or collaterals, the informal sector has relied on “Tontines”, “MGA”, and 
“Money Transfer Systems” to finance its activities.1 
Aware of the difficulties that the enterprises faced in the economy, the 
government has undertaken many economic measures, such as decreasing taxes, and 
deregulating the economy in order to eliminate fraud, corruption and to promote 
businesses. Also, this thesis examines indirectly how the Senegalese economic reforms 
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Senegal is located in the westernmost part of Africa and faces the Atlantic Ocean. 
The country shares boundaries with Mauritania to the north, Guinea and Guinea Bissau to 
the south, and Mali to the southeast.  Senegal has a surface area of 196,722 sq km, and its 
population is approximately 10 million people. The density of the population is 50.8-
inh/sq km. The country has a rainy season from June to October and a dry season for the 
rest of the year. Mainly dependent on agriculture, the Senegalese economy obtains its 
financial resources from peanuts but also from fisheries, tourism and phosphates. 
After obtaining independence in 1960, the government was strongly committed to 
improving the economy. In the early 1990s, the economy faced a severe crisis, which 
brought the country close to financial collapse. To restore economic growth and 
efficiency, Senegal implemented political and economic reforms to address the 
challenges of the economic and social crises that compromised the nation’s stability in 
the 1980s. In fact, Senegal began to adopt stabilization and structural adjustment policies 
because of increasing debts and its inability to pay them. With the support of the World 
Bank and IMF, the three main goals of the adopted policies were 
· Attaining macroeconomic balance by bringing national expenditures into 
line with national income; 
· Allocating resources more efficiently; 
· Facilitating investment by expanding resources over a longer period of 
time in order to raise the rate of economic growth and living standards, 
particularly for the poor.2 
Senegal planned to attain these goals through various measures such as limiting 
the public debt, decreasing government spending, reducing the size of the public sector, 
promoting exports, and implementing domestic market reforms and privatization. Two 
policies were implemented: the Agricultural Policy (NAP) and the New Industrial Policy 
(NIP). The NAP reduced the number of rural development agencies as well as farming 
subsidies while the NIP privatized state-owned businesses and removed protective tariffs. 
Despite all these efforts, the objectives of such refo rms were not reached. In the early 
                                                 
2 World Bank, 1996, p. 153. 
2 
1990s, the rate of economic growth was low and erratic and poverty and unemployment 
increased. To restore growth and efficiency, the government devalued the CFA Franc. 
Simultaneously, several other measures were implemented to improve the economy. The 
immediate effects of the devaluation were both positive and negative. For example, 
foreign debt and prices increased but so did exports and tourism.  Decreased imports 
were another effect of the devaluation but especially in broken rice3 that was widely 
consumed in the country. 
Additionally, these reforms increased the activities of the informal sector. 
According to the Senegalese Ministry of Trade’s report, the informal sector grew 4.3% 
on average between 1980 and 1991, growing 1.8 times more quickly than the industrial 
sector.4 Despite its importance, the informal sector is not very well understood by public 
agencies, which are unable to evaluate how this sector exactly contributes to the 
Senegalese economy.  
In Senegal, the urban elites compose the formal sector of the economy, the part of 
the economy that the state knows well. The formal sector, protected by law, is ensured 
certain rights, but those who work in this sector are obliged to pay taxes and fees to the 
state. However, in addition to the formal sector, an informal sector that is completely or 
partially beyond the control of the state exists. People lacking the financial means, 
education, and technology to compete with the formal sector compose the informal 
sector. Some of the people in the Senegalese informal sector trade legal and illegal goods, 
avoid paying rent to authorities on their stalls, and avoid paying customs duties on 
imported goods and taxes on what they manage to sell.  
In the state’s view, the informal sector is a threat because it undermines state 
control and avoids taxes. This sector is often accused of hindering the modernization of 
the economy. The economic reforms liberalized the economy and reduced state control 
over the market and, as a result, the informal sector became more inventive and creative. 
People in the informal sector provide goods at lower prices than in the formal sector. 
However, customers who purchase goods in these markets accept certain risks, such as 
                                                 
3 Broken rice is composed of granulated rice. 
4 Senegalese Ministry of Trade Preparatory Report on the Informal Sector, May 2001. 
3 
receiving lower quality goods and services or purchasing goods that are illegally obtained 
and which are often sold without receipts.5  
B. PURPOSE 
1. Objective 
This thesis examines how the informal sector has reacted to economic reform and 
further examines how these reforms have impacted the military. Recommendations are 
made for improving the reform process and for generating better results for the 
Senegalese people.  
2. Research Questions  
· What were the objectives of the reform process? 
· What success and failures are attributable to the reform process? 
· How has the informal sector reacted to the economic reform process? 
· What impacts the reforms had on the military? 
· What can be done to improve the economic reform process? 
C. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
1. Scope 
This thesis focuses on the Senegalese economic reforms started in the early 
1980s. The results of these economic reforms are examined, and the impact of the reform 
process on the informal sector and the military is examined. This research offers 
recommendations for improving the reform process. 
2. Organization 
Chapter I gives a background of the topic, examines the purpose of the thesis and 
describes its scope and organization. The Senegalese economy is examined before and 
after the reforms began. Therefore, in Chapter II, the origins of the economic crisis are 
examined through a retrospective analysis of the primary, secondary, and tertiary sector. . 
Also, the impact of the economic reforms on the military is studied in Chapter II. The 
military sector is examined, for the first time, to see how these reforms affect the military. 
In Senegal, military affairs are often left to soldiers or confidentially handled by 
politicians. The Senegalese military is a professional organization under civilian control, 
                                                 
5 Sources: Pedersen, P.O. and D. McCormick. 1999. African Business Systems in a Globalising World. 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37(1): 109-135. Laguerre, Michel S. 1994. The Informal City. 
Berkley: University of California Press. 
4 
and studying the Senegalese military is worthwhile because the military is affected by the 
economic reforms just as any other governmental institution is. Also, as consumers, 
Senegalese soldiers are living the economic crisis. Thereafter, Chapter III examines the 
impact of the reforms on the informal sector. Chapter IV of this thesis proposes policies 




















II. ORIGINS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND REFORMS  
A. THE PRIMARY SECTOR 
The primary sector of Senegal is essentially composed of agriculture, livestock 
and fishing. The arable land represents 27% of the total area of 196,722 sq km. 6 
Agriculture employs 70% of the population and accounts for approximately 19% of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In addition to cotton and sugar, groundnuts, which 
account for 40% of the cultivated land, are the chief cash crop, and the country’s main 
agricultural export.7 Millet, cassava, sorghum, rice, and corn compose the principal food 
crops. Since the level of agr icultural activity depends on rain, droughts are often a main 
reason for Senegal’s economic instability.  
According to official statistics, the GDP decreased from 1971 to 1984 because of 
a drought. Groundnuts, in the 1960s, were the principal product and represented 78% of 
all export revenues. Thus groundnuts were the largest single source of government 
revenues while oil refineries represented 40% of the industrial activity.8 The government 
was involved in the primary sector through many rural development agencies such as:  
· The Senegalese Development Bank (BSD); 
· The Senegal Marketing Board (OCA); 
· The Agricultural Research and Development Centers (CRAD); 
· The Senegal National Development Bank (BNDS);  
· The National Agricultural Marketing Board (ONCAD);  
· The Company for the Development of Textile Fibers (SODEFITEX). 
The government’s involvement in these institutions ensured that the government’s 
policy of introducing new agricultural crops such as cotton, maize and cowpeas was 
implemented. These new crops were introduced to stop the progressive decline of the 
groundnut industry caused by a decrease of approximately 25% of the country’s trade in 
groundnuts due to the French participation in the Common Agricultural policy of the 
                                                 
6 http://www.immigration-usa.com/wfb/senegal-geography.htlm. 
7 http://www.worldinformation.com/World/Africa/Senegal/profile.asp? country=221. 
8 Youm Prosper. 1991. “The Economy since Independence.” In Christopher Delgado and Sidi 
Jammeh, eds, The Political Economy of Senegal under Adjustment. New York: Praeger. 
6 
European Economic Community.9 To realize the government’s agricultural 
diversification policy, development agencies distributed credit, seed, subsidized 
fertilizers, and farm equipment to about 1,700 state cooperatives in villages throughout 
the country. 10 Government intrusion also occurred in other primary sector activities, such 
as fishing and phosphate mining, which accounted for 11% and 18% respectively of all 
exports in 1982.11  
In the 1980s, the agriculture growth was lower than the growth of the other sub-
sectors of the primary sector. For example, the value added in agriculture grew at an 
average rate of 2.7%, while the value added in stock farming grew at an average rate of 
3.1 %.12 The preponderant contribution of agriculture to the primary sector was relatively 
stagnant; therefore, agr iculture was not dynamic enough to improve economic growth. 
This failure was due to several reasons, such as:13 
· The government’s involvement in the primary sector through many 
parastatal organizations. For example, the government provided fertilizers 
and seeds to the peasants but not in sufficient quantities and they were of 
poor quality;  
· Fertilizers and seeds were given to the peasants on credit, who, in return, 
were obligated to sell their products to the National Marketing Board 
(ONCAD); 
· When buying the peasant’s products, the ONCAD deducted a sum from 
the price of the seeds and fertilizer. The unintended consequences were 
that a portion of the peasant’s peanut production (80% in 1984) was not 
sold to the ONCAD but instead drifted from the official market to the 
parallel markets at full prices;  
· Droughts and overpopulation in the peanut basin reduced the total acreage 
and worsened soil quality, and accelerated deforestation. 
                                                 
9 The decline was due to a loss of market share in France, which now gave preferential access to 
producers elsewhere in Europe. 
10 Voting for Reform : Democracy. Political Liberalization and Economic Adjustment. World Bank. 
Oxford University Press. June 1994. Samba Ka and Nicolas van De Walle. “Senegal: Stalled Reform in a 
Dominant Party System.” pp. 296-298. See Anonymous 1986 p. 1460, Barker 1985, Delgado and Jammeh 
1991, and Waterbury and Gersovitz 1987. 
11 Samba Ka and Nicolas van De Walle, p. 299. 
12 Francois Boye. “A Retrospective Analysis of the Senegalese Economy.” Center for Economic 
Research on Africa. Available on line at: http://alpha.montclair.edu/~lebelp/CERAFRM024Boye1990.pdf. 
13 Francois Boye. 1990, p. 17. 
7 
Concerned with the failure in the primary sector, the Senegalese government 
undertook economic reforms from 1981 onwards. The NAP was adopted and 
implemented in 1984 with the goal of reducing government involvement in production 
and marketing activities. As a result, the ONCAD was closed, many other rural parastatal 
organizations were dissolved, the market for agricultural inputs was liberalized, the 
subsidy on fertilizers was canceled, and the rural-state agencies were privatized. 
However, government attempts to reform the primary sector and the prices of some 
products, such as groundnuts, cotton, and rice, continued. Lobbyists who capitalized on 
government subsidies for personnel benefit delayed the reform process.  
Until 1991, despite the insistence of external aid and lending agencies, the 
government still resisted accelerating reforms in the primary sector and thus refused to 
decontrol the price of rice, the nation’s staple food, and also refused to abandon the 
subsidies on fertilizer. However, the report prepared by the Senegalese government in 
consultation with the staffs of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (June 4, 
1999) stated:   
With the goal of improving the assistance provided to the agricultural 
sector, the government has established a support program for producer 
organizations (PSAOP)…The agricultural services provided by the public 
sector will be limited to the following functions: (i) guidance, analysis, 
and projections in connection with agricultural development policies and 
programs; (ii) monitoring, coordinating and evaluating the agricultural 
development actions and policies implemented by public or private sector 
agents; and (iii) regulation and supervision. These various programs 
intended to improve the institutional environment and to strengthen the 
bases of agricultural production, are reinforced by several measures to 
promote private enterprise in agriculture, in particular by facilitating 
access to inputs and credit, and securing financing through a land 
ownership reform that would give investors all the guarantees that a free 
market can offer. 
Despite the government’s willingness to reduce its role in the primary sector, 
from 1961 to 1999 the per capita agricultural production index (base year 1989 to 1991, 
3-year average) decreased by almost 50%, falling from 176% to 96%.14  Also, the 
government’s disengagement from the primary sector is not yet complete. In fact, the 
government is still involved in the agriculture market through SONAGRAINES, a 
                                                 
14 FAO, Statistical Data Basis, 2000 (http//: www.fao.org). 
8 
marketing board that sells seeds, fertilizers, and farm equipments to peasants and then 
buys their products. The poor performance of the sector is mostly due to the 
government’s unwillingness to disengage itself fully from the primary sector and the lack 
of a strategic policy that allows the private sector to become involved in the primary 
sector gradually. Most of the adjustment programs in the primary sector were beset by 
setbacks from external shocks and delays in policy implementation and policy reversals. 
Under these conditions, the adjustment programs could not generate accelerated growth 
because of the lack of external competitiveness of the economy.  
B. THE SECONDARY SECTOR 
The secondary sector in Senegal is mainly composed of food processing, textiles 
and chemicals businesses and is dominated by import-substitution light industries owned 
by French people and, to a certain extent, by Lebanese businesses. The only heavy export 
industries are an oil refinery, a sulphuric/phosphoric acid plant, and a fertilizer complex 
(Industries Chimiques du Senegal). The industrial heavy secondary sector is inherently 
tied to the primary sector from which it receives most of its raw materials; therefore, 
climatic conditions can harm the industrial performance just as they harm the primary 
sector.  
During the 1980s, in addition to the climatic problems in the primary sector, many 
other elements, such as the high cost of electricity, water, telephone, and transportation 
made difficult for the industries to compete. The New Industrial Policy (NPI) was 
promulgated to privatize the water, the electricity, and the telecommunication companies 
in order to decrease the prices of their products. Growth of the industrial sector depends 
to a large extent on the response of domestic and foreign investors to the reduction of 
production costs due to privatization.  
Also, the New Industrial Policy recommended liberalizing trade policies in order 
to eliminate a significant amount of administrative inflexibility. In doing so, all 
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports were ended, special tariffs for specific 
industries were removed, and import and export licenses procedures were canceled.  
The government implemented other measures to assist the industrial sector, which 
faced competition due to the openness of the market, and to help these enterprises attain 
9 
future growth. For example the Industrial Promotion Fund (FPI) was created to help any 
enterprises that were willing to restructure. Also a new investment code was established 
to encourage and to promote businesses in the sector. Finally, the labor market was 
liberalized, and the Export Promotion Fund (FPE) to subsidize enterprises willing to sell 
part of their production abroad was founded.  
The goal of the NPI was to open up the economy to the international markets, to 
inform the capitalists that the government would no longer take over non-competitive 
businesses that were failing, and also to declare that the common law in fiscal matters 
would be the standard to which investors would be held (Cf. Senegalese law 87-25).15  
The inability of domestic firms to compete resulted from reductions in customs 
duties, which enabled foreign products to be more price competitive than similar locally 
manufactured products. In fact, tariff protection was reduced in 1986 and in 1988. 
Therefore, the average protection rate declined from 165% in 1985 to 90% in mid-
1988.16 In 1991, the increasing reliance of the government on exceptional revenue 
measures, such as the heavy taxation of petroleum imports, increased production costs 
such as energy, and caused firms to leave, to cease operation or to join the informal 
economy.  
The NPI was not a total success because of delays and reversals in implementing 
the reforms. In fact, the cost of production was not reduced because privatization of 
water, telephone, and energy was not implemented and protective measures that were 
removed were reintroduced. Moreover, tariff protection was reduced twice, first in 1986 
and again in 1988. As a result, the average effective protection declined from 165% in 
1985 to 90% in mid-1988, because the government, prodded by the need for revenues and 
the lobbying of domestic businesses unable to compete in the new environment, 
reintroduced protection measures.  Then, by August 1990 the average protection rate had 
                                                 
15 See Francois Boye. 1990, p. 27. 
16 Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization and Economic Adjustment. World Bank. 
Oxford University Press. June 1994. Samba Ka and Nicolas van De Walle. Senegal: “Stalled Reform in a 
Dominant Party System,” p. 320.  
10 
increased and reached 98%.17 Part of the value-added of industry18 transferred abroad by 
foreign employees and shareholders limited ability of the secondary sector to reduce the 
current account deficit completely. Had this money stayed in Senegal, the deficit would 
have been 50% lower before 1980 and at least 25% lower after 1980.19  In addition, the 
government is still involved in many enterprises as a shareholder even though 
development partners insist that the government completely withdraw from commercial 
activities. Today, the Senegalese government still holds a little bit less than 50% of the 
shares in the electricity company (SENELEC), more than 50% in the phosphate company 
(ICS), more than 50% in the oil refinery (SONACOS), and less than 50% in the water 
company (SDE) for which it owns the supply infrastructures.  During 1997, electric 
power outages lasted a total of 356 hours, whereas in part of 1998, the total duration of 
electric power outages was 436 hours.20  This is a tremendous economic loss that shows 
how government involvement in business can be detrimental to a country.  Also, special 
governmental advantages accorded to public enterprises produced an environment that 
was unfriendly to private enterprises and made competition almost impossible. 
C. THE TERTIARY SECTOR 
The tertiary sector in Senegal includes services produced and rendered by 
government agencies and by private enterprises to individual consumers or enterprises in 
the primary and secondary sectors. Government involvement in activities such as trade, 
transportation, electricity and water distribution, tourism, and many other tertiary 
activities curtailed the pace of reforms in the sector. Therefore, to privatize many 
activities in this sector, structurally reforming government agencies inherited from the 
colonial era and adapting them to the new economic environment was necessary. In fact, 
because it worried about putting government workers out of jobs, the government was 
unwilling to reduce the number of public sector employees. As a result, wages for the 
                                                 
17 Voting for Reform : Democracy, Political Liberalization and Economic Adjustment. World Bank. 
Oxford University Press. June 1994. Samba Ka and Nicolas Van De Walle. Senegal: “Stalled Reform in a 
Dominant Party System,” p. 320. 
18 Part of the salaries of foreign employees and the revenues of foreign shareholders is not reinvested 
in the economy, and represents money out of the economy. This money impacts the current account of the 
country negatively. 
19 See Francois Boye. 1990, p. 28. 
20 Foreign Investment Adviser Service (FIAS). “Senegal: Le Parcours de l’Investisseur (Investor’s 
Path).” March 1999, p. 65. 
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public sector accounted for 60% of government expenditures in 1980, and the number of 
employees in government agencies actually increased from about 10,000 in 1960 to 
59,300 in 1980 (Berg 1990, p. 4; World Bank Staff Estimates). Although the reform was 
supposed to decrease the number of public sector employees to reduce the size of the 
public administration, it did not. The table below shows the number of public sector 
employees and the cost of their salaries from 1981 to 1991.21 
 








(Billions  of 
Cfa) 









Bill as a 
Percent 
of GDP 
1981/1982 63,011 83.3 50.4 39.2 11.0 
1982/1983 66,310 92.7 49.7 36.5 10.4 
1983/1984 67,718 100.4 48.9 40.5 10.3 
1984/1985 67,034 106.6 49.1 41.9 9.7 
1985/1986 68,843 111.8 50.7 42.0 9.2 
1986/1987 68,131 119.8 51.5 41.9 8.9 
1987/1988 67,100 122.3 50.0 42.4 8.5 
1988/1989 66,549 125.1 50.5 41.0 8.5 
1989/1990 63,641 126.8 49.1 38.4 8.1 
1990/1991 66,549 125.1 55.8 43.6 8.1 
 
From:  World Bank 1990. Estimates of World Bank Staff 
 
From 1981 to 1990, the reform process removed 497 “ghost” employees, allowed 
747 personnel to retire early and permitted 1,283 employees to voluntarily leave the 
public sector.22 As a result, government wages decreased from 11% of GDP to 8.1%. 
Although the objective was to reach a wage bill of approximately 10 billion Cfa per 
month, much more effort was needed to decrease the number of government employees 
                                                 
21 Voting for Reforms: Democracy, Political Liberalization and Economic Adjustment. World Bank. 
Oxford University Press. June 1994, pp. 297-298, 321. 
22 World Bank Policy Research Report on “Adjustment in Africa.” 1994. 
*Current expenses=Running expenses  
*Total expenditure= Running expenditure + Equipment expenditure 
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in order to allow the private sector to become more involved in the economy. In addition 
to the decrease of government employees, Senegal liquidated, privatized, and 
rehabilitated approximately eighty-five of the public enterprises to improve the economy 
(See Appendix C).  
Another important problem to overcome was the loss of time and money 
engendered by the red tape of the Senegalese central bureaucracy. In fact, the cost to 
engage in business was high in terms of time and money as was the cost to import or 
export goods because of the lengthy and complex public procedures that needed to be 
fulfilled. For example, to establish a formal business, one had to deal with twelve 
different administrative documents. These documents then had to be submitted to thirteen 
different government agencies, and the time taken for these public offices to approve 
them was three to twelve months.23 As for the importation of goods from abroad, the 
procedures through public agencies, such as sanitary inspection, board of customs, and so 
on, could consume at least one to two weeks. The analysis that follows illustrates how red 
tape consumed tremendous amounts of time and money. 24 In fact, in Senegal, the 
importation and exportation of goods were rife with administrative formalities in order to 
protect domestic firms from outside competition (See Appendix A). Having the required 
documentation, which improved compliance with legal obligations, was sometimes 
mandatory for any transaction. Desoto noted:  
A law is “good” if it guarantees and promotes economic efficiency and 
“bad” if it impedes or disrupts it. The unnecessary costs of formality 
derive fundamentally from a bad law; the costs of informality result from 
the absence of a good law (Desoto, p. 132).  
Examining import and export operations involves a copious amount of red tape: 
manual processing by different parties who issue joint documents, the physical 
transmission of documents to the customs office, the manual settlement of duties, and 
many specific and petty formalities that require much time for custom offices to process. 
To alleviate these problems, the Senegalese government, with the support of the 
United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), funded and created 
                                                 
23 Appendix B shows the numerous government agencies involved in establishing a legal business. 
24 Trade Point. Report on “ORBUS 2000: Electronic Duty Clearance for Exportation and Importation 
of Goods.” July 1999. 
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the Trade Point Senegal (TPS) in order to simplify commercial transactions. The private 
sector was also solicited to contribute financially to establish the TPS. The Trade Point’s 
objective was to group most actors in international trade, including customs, insurance 
companies, freight forwarders, banks and other government agencies to concentrate all 
transactions needed for importing and exporting operations in one place. This should save 
time and money related to obtaining documents needed for importation and exportation 
operations. To achieve this end, the Trade Point created a computer network to facilitate 
importing and exporting to increase Senegal’s economic efficiency.   
The primary objectives of the TPS network were to reduce the time and costs of 
importing and exporting goods in Senegal. The specific objectives of the system were to 
decrease red tape, to improve procedures through new computer technology, to decrease 
data entry time, to decrease the time needed to transmit documents and to decrease the 
time for clearing customs by improving administrative procedures. Other specific 
objectives were to improve the methods and work conditions of the parties involved, to 
bring the different parties closer on foreign trade and to reduce the time for collecting 
documentation, and, finally, to accelerate payment. 
Unfortunately, so far, the TPS has not fully fulfilled all its missions and 
objectives. In fact, the intentions that sustain the TPS missions and objectives are 
wonderful, but the TPS is rife with roadblocks that inhibit its efficiency. The 
spearheading of TPS by a government central bureaucracy, the unavailability of 
computers in many businesses, and the lack of knowledge to use them seriously obstruct 
the TPS. The majority of people in informal business do not have a “computer culture.” 
The TPS should be an agency of and for the private sector. The TPS must possess an 
operational computer network between government agencies involved in the importation 
and exportation operations process and the businessmen who need to operate through an 
electronic network. The Senegalese government must equip its agencies with computers 
and personnel in order to facilitate and speed up the pace of business operations. The 
Senegalese businessmen must be free to use or to not use the services of the TPS 
according to how much the businesses value their time when processing their import and 
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export activities.25 Those who cannot afford to process their activities through the TPS 
can use the “Cyber-cafes.”26  
D. SENEGALESE ECONOMIC REFORMS AND THE MILITARY 
The Senegalese military inherited the French military organization and traditions. 
Even though the country achieved its independence, the French military still assists the 
Senegalese military in different areas. Also, the Senegalese military receives various 
kinds of assistance from the U.S., Germany, and many other donors that cooperate with 
the country. 
The Senegalese military fulfills many internal and international economic and 
social missions. As far as internal missions are concerned, the Senegalese military is  
highly involved in public health. In fact, the Senegalese government assigns the military 
many duties in this sector, but mainly in the countryside, which the private health sector 
eschews because it is not profitable. Most of the people in these localities do not have the 
spending power to afford medical care.  
The Senegalese military is also present in insecure zones, such as Casamance, 
where militant separatists have been waging a guerilla war against the government for 
more than twenty years. Also, the Senegalese military is involved in public works, 
building or repairing roads and bridges. Moreover, Senegalese soldiers are involved in 
coast guard missions.  
As for international missions, the Senegalese military has participated in many 
international and regional peacekeeping missions. The UN frequently employs the 
Senegalese military. In fact, the Senegalese military is present in many UN peacekeeping 
missions, such as MONUC in the Congo and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone.  
Other missions have been deployed to Cent ral Africa in 1997, to Rwanda in 1994, 
and to Liberia in 1991 to participate in the ECOMOG peacekeeping effort. 
The Senegalese military is not involved in political affairs; this has contributed to 
the political stability of the country since its independence. The military is well trained 
and disciplined (US Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs Report. January 
                                                 
25 Harvey S. Rosen. Public Finance, 6 th Edition, p. 234. 
26 “Cyber-cafes” are private shops that sell computer services. 
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2002). Also, the army is professional and under civilian control. The military of today in 
Senegal is one of those rare African militaries never having led a “coup d’ état.” In many 
African countries, economic hardships have led the public to withdraw support from a 
government that can be taken over by the military. In Senegal, the military has always 
been on the sidelines concerning the many social uprisings against inflation, 
unemployment or other effects of the economic reforms, although the decreasing military 
budget and military personnel have affected it.  
The structural adjustment and the voluntary departure program to decrease the 
size of the administration personnel did not affect the military. It maintained its 
traditional structures when the entire governmental administration was restructured to 
reduce public expenditures. The table below shows the changes in military expenditures 
and personnel during the reforms: 
 
Table 2.   Senegalese Military Expenditure in Constant US$ Million and Personnel in 
1,000s (Paramilitary troops, civilians employed by armed forces, and opposition 
forces are excluded). 
 
YEAR Military Expenditure  Share of GDP Military Personnel 
1989 105.7 NA 15.4 
1990 109.2 NA 18.4 
1991 107.1 1.9 18.4 
1992 154.7 1.8 18.4 
1993 119.7 2.2 18.4 
1994 90.3 1.8 14.4 
1995 79.8 1.8 13.3 
1996 77 1.7 13.3 
1997 74.9 1.6 13.3 
1998 70 1.5 11.0 
1999 70 1.5 11.0 
 
Data on share of GDP are from SIPRI Yearbook 2001. Military Expenditure and Arms 
Production. The other data on military expenditure and personnel are from Conversion 
Survey 2001 edited by the B.I.C.C 
NA = Not available 
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A gradual decrease of Senegalese military expenditures as a share of the GDP can 
be seen in the table above. In essence, the military has been affected by budget cuts just 
as all other government agencies have been. The number of military personnel has been 
decreasing from 1989 to 1999. The increase in the number of personnel military from 
1989 to 1993 were due to fighting the rebellion in Casamance that caused the government 
to raise the number of military conscripts.  
From 1986 to 1996, the number of military personnel has not been disclosed and 
important changes have not occurred since the budget has been cut.  
Military expenditures affect economic growth negatively if they are essentially 
used for internal or external conflict issues. The findings, which emerge from Dunne’s 
summary of 54 studies, show a negative relationship between military expenditures and 
economic growth in Africa in various areas (Dunne. 1996). Also, reductions in military 
expenditures contribute to the prevention of conflicts in and between countries. Also, the 
money saved from reductions of military expenditures can be use for public developing 
investments. If diminishing the military means for war solves the conflicts issues, the 
military can be downsized and a disciplined and high-quality defense force created.27 
This idea is examined further in Chapter IV, showing how it applies to the Senegalese 
military. 
E. MACROECONOMIC RESULTS AND ACCELERATION OF THE 
REFORM PROCESS 
During the 1980s and the 1990s, the objective to fix the economy was not 
reached. In fact, the economic crisis persisted and the GDP growth was erratic in the 
1990s (see table below). The reform measures, such as the decrease in the size of the 





                                                 
27 Nadir A. L. Mohammed. MNSED, World Bank, Washington DC. 1999, pp. 9 and 13. 
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From: IMF. Senegal: Structural Adjustment Facility 1998 to 2000. 
 
The economic crisis persisted despite the reforms implemented, such as the Short-
Term Stabilization Plan in December 1979, the Medium-Term Economic and Financial 
Recovery Plan (EFRP), which occurred from 1980 to 1984, and the Economic 
Adjustment Plan in the Medium and Long Term (PAML). The crisis also persisted 
despite the support of external aid and lending agencies to fix the economy. In fact, the 
budget deficit remained high between 1980 and 1983 (7 to 12 percent of GDP). For the 
same period, the national current account showed a deficit (more than 20% at one point). 
From 1983 to 1985, inflation was 11% per year and growth in the real GDP was 
negative.28  
The IMF discontinued the extended fund facility credit in January 1981 and 
replaced it with one-year standby agreements. As for the World Bank, it canceled the 
second part of its first structural adjustment loan in 1983 because of noncompliance of 
the Senegalese government with the agreements to restructure the economy. 29  The 
Senegalese government argued that part of the economic failure was due to the 1980 to 
1981 drought, which caused a poor groundnut crop and increased food imports. 
Nevertheless, the IMF and the World Bank restricted their support of the country. In 
                                                 
28 The Political Economy of Senegal under Structural Adjustment. Christopher L. Delgado and Sidi 
Jammeh. 1991. pp. 10-11.  See Appendix D. 
29 Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization and Economic Adjustment. World Bank. 
Oxford University Press June 1994. pp. 309- 310. 
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order to obtain such benefits from economic reforms, the country relied on other financial 
sources such as aid from other donors. However, aid management failed because of the 
weakness of the country’s institutions. This has been a usual occurrence in many African 
countries that resisted economic reforms programs to which they reluctantly agreed. At 
times, these nations influenced the nature of those programs to take advantage of their aid 
patrons or played different aid agencies against each other (Carol Lancaster. 1999, p. 35). 
When the EFRP was abandoned and replaced by the PAML, the current account 
deficit decreased from 20% to 10%, and the GDP deflator, as a measure of inflation, grew 
only by 2.5% from 1987 to 1988,30 but it must be recognized that these results were made 
possible by external aid and lending agencies, and debt forgiveness and rescheduling. In 
addition, when the PAML was implemented, the Senegalese currency was overvalued. 
The Senegalese currency (CFA franc) was pegged to the French franc at the rate of 50:1 
before January 1994. After the CFA franc was devalued, it was pegged to the French 
franc at the rate of 100:1. The high level of exchange rate variability and the high level of 
overvaluation of the currency hurt Senegal’s economic performance, thus making the 
PAML look ineffective. In fact, the devaluations of the French franc relative to other 
currencies occurred on many occasions without a change in the rate between the French 
franc and the Franc Cfa. In January 1994, the devaluation of the Franc Cfa and the large 
range of measures through the Private Sector Adjustment and Competitiveness Project 
(PASCO) were undertaken to reinforce the PAML. 31 
The informal sector grew and sought a way to survive under an economic climate 
of government hesitations and struggles against the World Bank and the IMF’s reforms 
of the economy. Also, the military was affected by this climate through limited or 
decreased budgets, limited or decreased personnel, and limited or decreased materiel to 
operate and fulfill its missions.  
                                                 
30 The Political Economy of Senegal under Structural Adjustment. Christopher L. Delgado and Sidi 
Jammeh. 1991. pp. 10-11. 
31 See Appendix C. 
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III. INFLUENCE OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS ON THE 
INFORMAL SECTOR  
A. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
Severe drought, depressed farm prices and the southern advance of the desert 
accelerated the movement of people from agricultural occupations to the urban informal 
sector. An additional factor fueling the growth of the informal sector has been the 
political and economic reforms implemented in many West African countries over the 
last ten years. Economic liberalization coupled with severe poverty, has contributed to the 
emergence of subsistent businesses catering to the survival needs of the population. 
Skilled young people who cannot find jobs at the end of their educationa l career often 
turn to the informal sector.  Consequently, the informal sector has changed because of 
addition of educated people.  
In Senegal, a few large French-owned import-export firms covering all aspects of 
trade including retailing dominate the formal sector.  Existing alongside these companies 
are extremely competitive small-scale traders specializing in the wholesale and retail 
distribution of fabrics and consumer goods. A limited number of larger retail stores deal 
in mostly imported goods.  In the past, Lebanese merchants were the middlemen between 
French trading companies and the local population. Now, Senegalese merchants selling 
popular consumer goods are gradually replacing the Lebanese. By contrast, the informal 
sector, expanding dynamically, employs an important part of the workforce of the 
country. The informal sector is mainly involved in making household furniture (lamps, 
beds, cabinets and desks), making kitchenware (stoves, pans and containers), repairing 
watches, radios, televisions and  others electronic goods, cooking, and operating 
restaurants, making clothes, shoes and accessories, changing and lending money, 
transporting goods and people, and so on. 32  
1. Comparing the Informal Sector with the Formal Sector 
The following chart compares the characteristics of the informal sector with those 
of the formal sector:     
 
                                                 
32 Fluitman, 1989; King, 1977, Portes, et. al., 1989. 
20 
Table 4.   Comparison of the Informal Sector with the Formal Sector. 
 
Characteristics Formal Sector Informal Sector 
Entry Barriers High Low 
Technology Capital Intensive Labor Intensive 
Management Bureaucratic Family base 
Capital High Scarce 
Work Hours Regular Irregular 
Wages Labor Normal Low 
Inventories Large Small 
Financial Services Banks Personal, Informal 
Fixed Cost Large Negligible 
Customers Relations Impersonal Personal 
Government Subsidy Often Large None 
Markets Often Export Rarely Export 
 
From: Webster, Filder, 1996, p. 6. 
Most people enter the informal sector as a means of surviving. This survivability, 
being sensitive to changing market demand and product types, depends on skills and 
strategies that consist of linking buyers and sellers and producers, locating market niches 
in seemingly over-crowded industries, finding sources of capital, obtaining new 
equipment, knowing where to locate the business or production facility, and knowing 
how to establish a small business. 
The informal sector encompasses many economic activities that are usually 
overlooked in economic statistics because businesses in the sector operate in small 
family-based units and are established, owned and operated by one or a few individuals. 
Businesses are started and maintained with little capital and are unable to obtain formal 
credit. Units that operate in the informal sector are ill equipped, have little infrastructure, 
and are very labor- intensive. Another fact is that businesses in this sector are either 
ignored or tolerated by the government. Goods and services made and offered by the 
informal sector are generally low quality relatively than those offered by the formal 
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sector.33 Nevertheless, the informal sector still contributes significantly and positively to 
the Senegalese economy, as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 5.   Contributions of the Formal and Informal Sector to GDP (in Percentage). 
 
 
From: Ministry of Economy and Finance, Direction of Statistics/Elaboration: 
International Labor Office, Different Years. Le Senegal à la Veille du Troisième 
Millenaire, p. 325. 
 
According to the table above, between 1986 and 1990, the informal sector 
significantly increased its contribution to the GDP, rising from 31.3% to 45.3%. 
Therefore, the formal sector and informal sector are highly and indisputably 
interconnected. The informal sector is a great consumer of formal sector products and an 
important channel of trade for the formal sector (Patrice Dauserau, Andre Marteus, and 
Herman Schnab L. 1996). Yet because of the interconnection between the formal and the 
informal sectors, the informal sector’s smuggling activities can influence the formal 
sector. In fact, if the informal sector is engaged in smuggling, the formal sector goods are 
                                                 
33 Fluitman, 1989; King, 1977; Muskin, 1997; Portes, et. al., 1989; Webster & Filder, 1996. 
* The primary sector is included in the formal sector because only the urban informal sector is taken 
into account in the table. 
 1982 1984 1986 1990 
Primary Sector* 27.5 22 26 20 
Secondary Formal 
Sector 
13.1 16.2 18.3 13.3 
Secondary Informal 
Sector 
3.5 3.8 3.7 7.8 
Total Secondary 
Sector 
16.6 20 22 21.1 
Tertiary Formal 
Sector 
28.5 29 24.3 24.9 
Tertiary Informal 
Sector 
27.1 29 27.4 37.5 
Total Tertiary Sector 55.6 58 51.7 62.4 
Total Formal Sector 69.1 67.2 68.6 58.2 
Total Informal Sector 30.6 32.8 31.1 45.3 
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left unsold.  Ironically, the consumers benefit from smuggled products, because of their 
low prices and high quality. Moreover, these smuggled products are incentives for the 
local enterprises to improve their products. On one hand, it is true that smuggling can 
decrease government tax revenues. On the other hand, smuggling can help improve the 
economy by pushing the local enterprises to produce similar smuggled goods to raise the 
quality and to lower the price of their products in order to maintain or increase their 
market share. This improves the economy in general and can be more advantageous for 
the government.  
Clearly, the informal sector is not only important to the Senegalese economy, but 
has also become an inherent and ubiquitous element of the economy. Today it accounts 
for a very significant proportion of the Senegalese GDP. The informal sector, by 
producing goods, creating employment, and reducing poverty politically stabilizes many 
developing countries, such as Senegal.  
2. Advantages of the Informal Sector  
Advantages of the informal sector are numerous and varied when compared to the 
formal sector. In fact, domestic products are easily available because the goods are 
produced near the small-scale businesses. Due to the small quantities of needed products, 
businesses can obtain their daily supply and avoid accumulating inventories. Moreover, 
since the informal sectors are close to customers, charges for distribution are eliminated 
or reduced. Due to the proximity of their supplies, customers are informed daily about 
their orders and can make quick modifications if necessary. Another advantage is that 
small-scale businesses are more flexible than large enterprises due to their size, their 
investments and the mobility of their workforce. Small-scale businesses adapt very 
quickly to changes in the market and to constraints in the environment. They can hire and 
lay off employees easily, develop or diminish their production, and supply new products 
or services. Also, due to the difficulties of obtaining credit from the banking system, the 
informal sector turns to micro-finance for its equipment.  
According to Hernando De Soto, one of the strengths of the informal sector is 
itinerant vending. In fact, itinerant vendors have no fixed location. They roam the entire 
day when operating. Their income depends entirely on their ingenuity as they move about 
in search of customers, since it is highly unlikely that customers will search for them. 
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While roaming in search of customers, they observe what goods are being sold. They see 
other, apparently more prosperous vendors working from carts in the same location each 
day. Various suppliers offer the itinerant vendors goods at different prices and on 
different terms. The vendors learn from more experienced friends and relatives and swap 
experiences with others who are also beginning. In so doing, they discover tha t the street 
is a school where people learn what goods are needed and the value attached to this need. 
Over time, they acquire more business savvy. Street vendors begin to establish routes for 
their daily itinerary. At the same time, they replace small carrying cases they use for their 
wares with a cart giving them more mobility, and a larger scale of operations. By 
repeating the same routes over and over again, vendors begin to identify with their 
customers and with other vendors operating near that circuit. This gradual process of 
identification generates a reputation, which earns the vendor not only the trust of 
customers but also credit from suppliers.34 
In Senegal, while most people who are involved in the informal sector have low 
incomes, many informal entrepreneurs have relatively high incomes. Informal enterprises 
accomplish many of the same functions as the formal sector enterprises, but generally on 
a smaller scale. They are involved in selling, distributing and maintaining goods 
produced in the formal sector. In the informal sector, the upper echelons are composed of 
relatively successful micro-entrepreneurs, and of the poor who struggle to survive at the 
bottom tiers of the self-employed. The first group still needs “modern” skills, such as 
business management, accounting, and technical skills to succeed. These upper echelons 
have unionized to protect the sector against the harassment of the state and the formal 
sector. Generally united in an organization called the National Union of the Traders and 
Industrials of Senegal (UNACOIS), this first group influences the policies and the 
business regulations for their interests. While implementing the reforms, the UNACOIS 
played an important role in supporting many economic reforms that were in their favor, 
such as ending price controls, eliminating prior authorization requirements for importing 
rice, textiles, and many other goods, meanwhile trying to undermine reforms that were 
not to their advantage, such as the devaluation of the Franc Cfa, which increased the 
prices of imported goods. 
                                                 
34Hernando De Soto, 1989, p. 63. 
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B. THE INFORMAL SECTOR: UNEMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY  
1. Unemployment Issues 
Structural adjustment and economic liberalization policies have induced social 
and economic changes in Senegal. In examining the outcomes of these policies, scholars 
disagree as to what effects are caused by the policies and what effects are not. Although 
the government established an agricultural development bank (la Caisse Nationale de 
Crédit), farmers could not afford unsubsidized fertilizer. This caused low productivity. 
Proceeding further in their disengagement from the agricultural sector, the rural banks 
and cooperatives began to close as well, resulting in credit and equipment scarcity that 
left the farmers “empty-handed” (Gellar, 1995:73,76; Knight, 1994:67-80; Weissman, 
1990: 1682). 
The government’s focus on export agriculture decreased the rate of subsistence 
agriculture in favor of cash crops, such as peanut and export crops, which included rice. 
Farmers had no choice but to sell whatever they had to offer at whatever price they could 
get. Thus, the farmers’ spending power decreased. This situation collapsed social and 
economic networks and increased migration to the urban areas, especially by the youth 
from 15 to 30 years of age (Knight 1994: 51-66). Obviously, many of these people, who 
cannot all be employed by the formal industry or the government, joined the informal 
sector. The following table shows the labor market segmentation in African economies. 
As a matter of fact, although the subsidy for fertilizer was curtailed, the 
Senegalese government still intervened in the market crops through SONAGRAINES, 
which did not allow the farmers to obtain the best price on these agricultural supplies. In 
addition, the government, in exchange for provid ing seeds and other agricultural supplies, 
then appropriated some of the farmers’ revenues. Unfortunately, this government 
intervention did not allow the peasants to take advantage of a free agricultural market by 
selling their product at profitable prices. This government intervention and many other 
factors, such as drought and a lack of technology, caused a decreased the per capita 
agricultural production index by almost 50% from 1961 to 1999.  
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· Commercial Farmers 
· Formal Sector Firms 
· Government 
Employment  
Informal Activities · Micro-enterprises in 
Informal Activities 
· Peasant farmers 
· Micro-enterprises in 
informal activities 
 
From:  Fidelis Ezeala-Harrison and Senyo B-S-K. Adjibolosoo. Perspectives on 
Economic Development in Africa, 1994. p. 65. 
 
Owing to this decrease in productivity, people began migrating into the cities 
looking for better wages. This migration aggravated the level of unemployment in the 
cities. In fact, in Dakar, the rate of unemployment was estimated at 24.4% in 1992 (Kante 
et al. 1994). The unemployment rate was due not only to the rural crisis, but also to the 
crisis in the industrial and public sectors. The average annual growth rate of the 
manufacturing value added was -1% in the 1970s and -0.8% in the 1990s (UNIDO, 
1999).35 Moreover, in 50% of the main manufacturing branches the growth rate of 
employment was negative (UNIDO, 1999).  
Many enterprises could not survive the external competition. Hit especially hard 
by rising unemployment with cutbacks in health and education, parents were less able to 
support their children. This situation has led to the growing tragedy of street children 
(Diouf-Camara, 1996; Weisman, 1990: 1628). Again, laying off employees increased the 
number of people who entered the informal sector to survive. The informal sector 
employed more than 50% of the active population of the Sub-Sahara African countries 
                                                 
35 UNIDO Databases, Country Statistics Senegal, New York 1999. Available at: http//: 
www.unido.org 
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and was growing at the rate of 6.7% annually. 36 According to other surveys, the informal 
sector is an important creator of jobs and an incubator of small and medium-size 
enterprises. Therefore, the sector is, in essence, a kind of safety net, which absorbs the 
shock of periodic economic expansion and contraction by absorbing excess labor and 
providing additional income. This is a good reason for the government to avoid 
implementing policy that can destroy the informal sector.  
In Senegal, the informal sector and the state are the two main providers of jobs 
and income. In 1991, the informal sector accounted for 58.7% of the working urban 
population. 37 However, while the informal sector creates many jobs, these jobs, 
compared to those in the formal sector, are of low quality for employment. The following 
data indicating the importance of the Senegalese informal sector in the economy: 
· Share of GDP: 12% in 1998 
· Production of goods: 193.4 billion (CFA) 
· Trade revenues: 1936.13 billion (CFA) in 1996 
The development of the informal sector was a response to the economic crisis and 
the macro-economic adjustment. Those individuals who lost their income or who suffered 
a drop in income clearly contributed to the growth of the informal sector, since people 
sought new jobs in that sector and reduced their consumption habits. Subsequently, the 
demand for less expensive goods and services from the informal sector has increased. 
Regarding the importance of the movement of people toward the informal sector, 
the Senegalese head of state at the traditional labor festivities in 1996 in his address to the 
trade union and employer organizations stated that the challenge was to extend social 
protection to the informal sector. Of course, the objective was not to impose the rules 
governing the structured sector, but rather to adopt rules applicable to the specific nature 
and aspirations of those who operated in the informal sector. For example, the idea of 
introducing social security to the informal sector came from workers forced from the 
formal sector into the informal sector as the result of layoffs and business closures, 
mainly in the wake of structural adjustment programs. According to a survey of the 
                                                 
36 Fluitman, F. (Ed.). (1989). “Training for Work in the Informal Sector.” Geneva: International Labor 
Organization. 
37 Senegalese Ministry of Trade Preparatory Report on the Informal Sector, May 2001. 
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international labor organizations in the sector, only 14% of the working population 
possessed social security or other benefits. To interest the sector in securing benefits for 
its workers, a workshop was held with organizations from the informal sector 
participating. Representatives of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, the Social 
Security Fund (CSS), which is a joint body, composed of workers and employer 
representatives, and the Senegalese old–age pension insurance institution, which is also a 
joint body, attended this workshop. As a result of this workshop, many benefits were 
proposed for the informal sector, such as:  
· Prenatal allowances;  
· Maternity allowances; 
· Family allowances; 
· Coverage of industrial accidents and occupationa l diseases; 
· Coverage of medical and surgical care pharmaceutical and incidental 
expenses, hospital costs; 
· Annuities paid to the eligible parties of victims in the event of a fatal 
accident. 
Yet according to the international labor organization (ILO), the social security 
fund for the Dakar region has only registered 1,000 workers, mainly crafts people. The 
efforts were not successful because the informal sector feared being identified and 
controlled by the government. Another reason for the failure was that the funding of these 
benefits would have been secured partly or totally from taxes on employees of the 
informal sector; informal sector employers perceived this as a government trap or a ploy 
because the cost of receiving these benefits seemed too high relative to the benefits. 
2. Poverty Issues 
Senegalese lower and middle classes did not benefit from the economic reforms. 
In fact, the majority of the population felt largely excluded from the benefits of economic 
growth. The proportion of poor households in Senegal was 58% in 1995, much higher 
than the average in other African countries, which was 44%. Successive positive real 
growth did not compensate for the sacrifices the people made.  
Poverty is still very real and can be explained by inequalities in the distribution of 
national income. Those with the highest income, comprising 20% of the population 
receive 50% of the national income, which is 17 times greater than the income received 
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by the poorest 20%.38 A study by Mr. Guy Pfeffermann of the World Bank shows that 
the beneficiaries of social spending in the developing countries are not the poor. In 
addition, in most developing countries, governments have little idea of who their poor 
are. Not only is the concept of poverty hard to define, but also most of the governments 
in developing countries do not recognize the impoverished because, to a large extent, 
they are not in contact with them. In developing countries, the average income per capita 
was estimated to be $560 in 1980. In 1981 it was $450. Behind such numbers lies human 
wretchedness on a dreadful scale.39  
Economic reforms are intended to foster GDP per capita growth. This has been 
proven in many countries, and there is every reason to believe that it has helped the poor, 
based on the strong links between growth and poverty reduction (World Bank 1990). 
However, in many adjusting African countries, implementing policy has been very 
sporadic, and growth has not shown much, if any, recovery. 40 This did not allow the 
reforms to reach the objectives of reduc ing poverty as intended. Most people interpreted 
this situation as a failure of the economic reforms. In Senegal, other factors aggravate the 
level of poverty. In fact, from 1994 to 1998, prices rose because the ending of price 
control on many products led traders to speculate and to raise many prices. Also, the 
suspension of public subsidies brought prices up on some products, hurting consumers of 
these goods. However, the suspension of these public subsidies saved money for the 
government that could make Senegalese society in general better off, if the government 
spent it wisely or returned the money to the Senegalese people in the form of tax cut. At 
the beginning of the reforms, the reduced income generated by rural activities, 
unemployment, and the cont inuous downward pressure on wages due to the massive 
privatization and re-structuring of industrial enterprises during the adjustment period 
decreased the level of spending power of the workers in the directly affected industries. 
In response to the situation, people, many young urban people, had to create their own 
                                                 
38 Paper on “Sustained Growth and Persistent Poverty in Senegal,” Abdoul Souleye Sow, Taoufik Ben 
Abdallah. 
39 The Economist: “A Survey of the Third World. Poor Man’s Burden.” September 1989. p. 3. 
40 World Bank Policy Research Report 1994: Adjustment in Africa, p. 163. 
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means of survival. 41 The informal sector arose and was the main entry-point into the 
workforce for these young people. Although millions of dollars were provided to increase 
employment in order to decrease poverty, reversing the trend toward massive 
unemployment affecting the country was difficult. From 1988 to 1990, union activities 
against layoffs of employees were virulent and inflation was high; therefore the 
Senegalese government delayed or rejected elements of the reform program, violating the 
agreements with external agencies. The partners at development, which believed that 
pursuing the economic reforms could lead to a general strike, tolerated this breakdown in 
the reform process. 
In many other countries, such as Ghana and Mozambique, national entrepreneurs 
who were against the market liberalization have harshly criticized the World Bank over 
its insistence on full trade liberalization. In Senegal, entrepreneurs of the Professional 
Union of Industrialists (SPIDS) concluded that the trade liberalization has hurt the local 
industry by allowing an influx of cheap foreign imports. In Mozambique, industrials have 
complained about the lifting of the surtax on raw cashew exports that would not allow 
them to be competitive and, therefore, would force a shutdown of their factories.42 
Taking such concerns into account, Mr. Wolfensohn, the President of the World Bank, 
stated during his visit in Mozambique: “The best thing would be to have a world-class 
processing industry.” However, when addressing Ghana’s Parliament, Mr. Wolfensohn 
admitted that the World Bank wants to listen to its partners and be flexible with them. 43 
As a matter of fact, these economies were not well prepared for reforms and have been 
protected from external competition for a long time.  
In reality, the entrepreneurs desired an alternative policy that could process the 
reforms gradually in order to give the enterprises time to prepare for a more open 
economy. The problem with this alternative is that it would hurt consumers since local 
                                                 
41 A household survey conducted from 1991 to 1995 showed an indicator of caloric intake below the 
poverty threshold. In fact, 58% of households are living below the minimum of 2,400 calories per day for 
adults. See Senegal Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. May 8, 2000. Available on-line at 
www.imf.org/external/NP/prsp/2000/SEN/01/INDEX.HTM. 
42 The lifting of the surtax caused a decrease of taxes on cashews imported to Mozambique. Therefore, 
these cashews imported were cheaper and more price competitive than the Mozambican cashews. 
43 Africa Recovery, Vol. 10 No. 4, January-April 1997. Available on-line at: 
www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/1997/wbank.htm. 
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products would be more expensive than imported products. Although advocates of state 
intervention in the economy think that the markets are not perfect because resources are 
not well allocated in developing countries, in reality state intervention has undermined 
economic reforms in many developing countries.  
Poverty has enhanced and fueled the growth of the informal sector because 
consumers who have low incomes and are more numerous shop for goods and services in 
the informal sector. Although these goods and services are often of low quality, 
compared to those in the formal sector, they meet the survival needs of the consumers 
(Fidelis Ezeala-Harrison and Senyo B-S-K. Adjibolosoo. 1994, p. 72). Products for sale 
are often repackaged in very small portions or by piece to allow poor consumers to buy 
certain items, usually food, in affordable quantities. Small packaging includes selling 
sugar by the cube and buying coffee, tea or powdered milk in small plastic bags. Street 
food has become a booming business in Dakar and other urban centers. In the Republic of 
Benin, such food is often called “all terrain food” or “food aid” because it is cheap, is 
readily available and fills hungry stomachs. The quality of the food does not matter 
much. What is important is that one can avoid hunger while working.   
Women often work in the food processing sectors. For example, certain surveys 
estimate that in Dakar, 50,000 women are involved in small-scale food processing. 
Women are strongly involved in individual entrepreneurship in Senegal. Women in 
Senegal have poor access to education and training. As a result, employment 
opportunities for women in the formal sector are very limited. Despite gender-equity and 
antipoverty programs implemented by the World Bank, women have not benefited much 
from these programs; therefore, they become involved in the informal sector to survive. 
For example, according to UNESCO, in the Republic of Togo and in the Republic of 
Benin, at least 90% of the women are involved in the informal sector, whereas women 
are only 6% of the private formal sector. According to the “Program on Poverty 
Reduction Strategy” implemented with the support of the IMF, the Senegalese 
government has made efforts to improve the status of women. Progress has already been 
made in education where the objectives were to raise the primary education enrollment 
rate to 70% in the year 2000 and 75% in 2001. The recommended objective by the 
partners at development is to reach 95% by 2008. The effort will focus on eradicating 
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illiteracy, especially among women (Senegal Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. 
May 8, 2000). 
C. THE INFORMAL SECTOR: THE FINANCIAL AND TAX ISSUES 
1. Financial Issues 
The Senegalese banking system continues to be reformed to improve the 
efficiency of the economy. The first reforms limited government access to bank 
financing. These reforms have been pursued in order to develop a monetary and credit 
policy and a financial market. The following actions have been implemented to reach the 
objectives 
· Design a credit policy consistent with targets for regional growth, inflation 
and external assets; 
· Enhance the soundness of the banking system and improve financial 
connections; 
· Promote private equity and develop the market for securities. 
Some companies have no particular problem with the banking system. They have 
obtained the resources needed for their current operations and for their investments from 
the banks. However, the majority of enterprises complain about the high interest rates and 
the complexity of the system. For example, the West African Countries Central Bank 
(BCEAO) uses very demanding criteria to assess the credibility and reliability of any 
commercial banks that want to borrow money beyond a certain amount. Thus, companies 
that do not satisfy these criteria could not issue bonds or shares. Therefore, commercial 
banks do not to lend large amounts of funds to enterprises.44 Nevertheless, the financial 
institution system offers some interesting possibilities, such as credit sale, the financing 
of credit sale, leasing and venture capital. The companies complain about the interest 
rates charged by these institutions and their reluctance to lend to small and medium size 
companies. Naturally in keeping with these standards, the banks were much more 
reluctant to lend to the enterprises of the informal sector than to those of the formal sector 
in which they own shares. Most actors in the informal sector cannot meet the bank 
                                                 
44 “Barriers to Business Expansion in a New Environment: The Case of Senegal,” p. 13. Available on-
line at: www.eagerproject.com/discussion31.shtml. 
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requirements to obtain credit. Very often banks argue that they cannot lend money to the 
informal sector because people in the sector:45 
· Do not possess credit history and lack collateral; 
· Do not live in areas near banking centers; 
· Are illiterate and inexperienced with the banking operations;  
· Need small loans for short periods of time and on an almost immediate 
basis as their investment opportunities come and go quickly; 
· Make small deposits and make frequent withdrawals from savings, which 
add to the bank’s costs (Webster, L. & and Fidler, P., p. 22). 
In fact, 93.8% of the actors in the informal sector declare that they have never 
qualified for a bank loan (Senegalese Ministry of Trade Preparatory Report on the 
Informal Sector, 2001). Despite micro-finance institutions that do lend to poor people, 
actors in the informal sector generally use other methods besides the formal sector for 
financing. However, this situation drains cash from the banking system, thus making it 
difficult to know the exact amount of savings in the economy. This money, circulating 
within the informal sector, moves inside and outside the country. The process used to 
transfer the money is practical and cheaper than the conventional banking system. The 
system is based on a strong relationship between people in the informal sector. The charts 
below demonstrate one of the processes. 
The first chart below explains the process of transferring goods for money that is 
composed of three steps:  
 
a. Transfer of Goods and Money 
Senegalese 





Senegalese trader in 
the informal sector/ 
Receiver #1 
Money in 
Franc Cfa Bank or 
Family of the 
Sender/ 
Receiver # 2  
 
 
                                                 
45 “Informal Education Strategies for Skill Acquisition in West Africa: A Review of the Literature and 
of Recent Significant Research Results.” Available on-line at: www.fsu.edu/~1v-adea/englis h/abe13.html. 
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· Step One :  A Senegalese trader in New York obtains and sends American 
goods to Senegal; 
 
· Step Two:  A Senegalese trader in the Senegalese informal sector sells 
these American goods to customers in Senegal and receives payment in 
Franc Cfa; 
 
· Step Three: The trader in Senegal gives the money received from the sale 
of the merchandise to the New York trader’s family in Senegal or places 
the money in the New York trader’s Senegalese bank account.  
 
The second chart below describes the process of transferring money. It 
also involves three steps: 
b. Transfer of Money 
Senegalese alien 
in New York/ 
Sender # 1 
Money ($US) + Fee 
Senegalese Trader in 
New York/Sender # 2  
Senegalese Trader in 
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· Step One: A Senegalese alien in New York gives a Senegalese trader in 
New York a sum of American money, including a fee for making the 
transaction; 
 
· Step Two: The Senegalese trader in New York calls another trader in 
Senegal who works in the informal sector to confirm that he has received 
the cash and the fee; 
 
· Step Three: This second Senegalese trader then delivers the money in 
local currency to the Senegalese beneficiary in Senegal designated by the 
Senegalese alien in New York. 
 
These processes suppose a permanent availability of money with the 
Senegalese trader in the Senegalese informal sector. These systems work and appear to be 
cheap and fast. For example, to send $1,000 to Senegal through Western Union at the rate 
of today (June 11, 2002), one has to pay a $70 fee for the transfer. The transfer of this 
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money takes at least one day. For the same amount at the same date and for the same 
destination through a Senegalese trader in New York, one has to pay only a $30 fee for 
the transfer. In addition, the exchange rate of the dollar with the Cfa is always below the 
current one of the official market for someone who uses the informal process of transfer. 
The exchange rate is also negotiable; people very often bargain for a low rate. The 
amount sent through the Senegalese trader in New York is available for the Senegalese 
beneficiary in less than one hour after the Senegalese trader in New York receives the 
money. The informal system of money transfer is also cheaper because it is very often an 
additional service to a main business that the Senegalese trader runs in New York. There 
is almost no additional charge of personnel or office rent. Only a telephone/fax is enough 
to run this kind of business. Also, the informal system of transferring money is more 
flexible than the formal one. In fact, in the American formal process of transferring 
money, if one transfers abroad $10,000 over a time period of one month from a same 
sender (Banks or Western Union), he has the obligation to fill out an Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) form and to communicate his social security number or any other valid 
identification number. This American formal process is full of red tape, compared to the 
Senegalese informal system of transferring money in which, one saves more time and 
money. The family members and best friends are involved and are also interested in 
making the system reliable. The currency does not move from place to place and the 
network plays an important role in the procedure. 
Other systems are used in the informal sector, such as the “Tontine” or the 
Mutual Guarantee Association (MGA). Despite some similarities, tontines and the MGA 
differ. In fact, the tontine is essentially informal whereas to deal with banks, the MGA 
must fulfill some formal requirements. Also, tontines are not permanent and the MGA is 
intended to be a lasting self-help organization with a specific financial function. 
Moreover, the MGA belongs to the formal financial sector whereas tontines are 
essentially informal and reluctant to deal with banks. In term of objectives, tontines are 
multi-purpose, and the MGA has the single objective of facilitating access to bank 
credit.46 The tontine is a traditional, informal saving organization, whereas the MGA is a 
                                                 
46 Bernd Balkenhol and E. H. Gueye. “Tontines and the Banking System: Is There a Case for Building 
Linkage?” Available on-line at: http:// oracle02.ilo.org/public/English/employment/finance/papers/wpap-
2.htm. 
35 
group of people that pool resources into a fund to cover a bank claim in case one of the 
associates defaults on a loan. 
c. How Does a Tontine Work? 
Members of a Tontine contribute, for example, 100 Cfa each at a monthly 
meeting. The first person is chosen randomly and receives, if there are 20 members, 
FCFA 2000 Cfa, whereas the next month, another person, chosen randomly, receives the 
same amount as an interest free loan. However, the person must stay in the group and 
continues contributing every month. Also, if a member incurs an unexpected debt the 
group can make some arrangements to modify the sequence. In case one of the members 
dies, the amount he owes to his contributors is claimed to his inheritors but very often, 
people in a tontine are so close that such a claim is never made. The money the deceased 
owed is let to his family as a memorial fund. The members share a deep sense of 
solidarity.  
In Senegal, women create small businesses from the money received or 
use the tontine system to shop for important items they are unable to afford otherwise. 
Many types of tontines exist: 
· The Neighborhood Tontine: In this tontine, women are mainly involved. It 
is organized to finance the social events of tontine members; 
· Work Place Tontine: The members work together in the same office or 
operate in the same market. The system helps to co-finance industrial or 
commercial investments undertaken by individual members or the group 
as a whole; 
· The Community-based Tontine: The collected sum is spent on a collective 
investment (farming activities, social events, and so on). 
In the late 1980s, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 
General Bank of West African States (BCEAO) conducted a training program on 
commercial bank lending to small enterprises. As a result of this program, it was clear 
that commercial banks were unprepared to make adjustments or to be innovative and 
extend financial services to small-scale operators. Therefore, the informal sector realizes 
that looking beyond the banking sector helps finding ways to deliver financial services on 
a small scale and at a low cost. 
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Micro-finance is very important in developing countries where most 
people work in the informal sector. Many small-scale businesses and low-income 
entrepreneurs are bringing progress to many West African economies, owing to 
innovative financial institutions that provide small loans and technical advice to poor and 
under funded micro-enterprises. On June 19 to 21, 1996, a West African high level policy 
forum was held on micro-finance and its potential impact on poverty reduction in 
Bamako, Republic of Mali. The government of the Republic of Mali, the World Bank, 
and the Consultative Group for Assistance to the Poorest (CGAP) hosted the event. 
Finance ministers, Central Bank governors and micro-finance practitioners from 16 West 
African countries attended. This gathering focused on how to implement a financing 
system that could help support small-scale businesses in order to reduce poverty. At this 
time, it was important that the micro-finance institutions provided the needed capital and 
technical assistance to the millions of micro-enterprises of the informal sector that formal 
banks do not serve. Again, these micro-enterprises, in West Africa, account for 30% to 
50% of the GDP and 50% to 75% of employment in many countries. A financing system 
is necessary to help these businesses develop and progress.  
Small-scale financing is one of the most effective tools for improving 
Africans’ economic prospects and helping them combat poverty. Ms. Thelma Awori, 
Deputy Assistant Administrator of the UNDP, said during a conference in Mali that, “The 
growing and powerful lesson of micro-finance is that financial services are a basic need 
which can integrate the poor in the economic life of their societies.”  
Many micro-credit organizations raise a significant portion of their funds 
from local savings. The Senegalese Ministry of finance has, in October 1996, identified 
363 local savings and credit banks, commonly known as “mutual.”47 The ability of 
micro-credit organizations to mobilize domestic capital is particularly important at a time 
when both governments and donors are experiencing severe constraints. Micro-credit 
organizations have various approaches to lending. Some of them deal with individual 
enterprises and others with organized groups. However, it is costly to manage many small 
loans as those who receive the loans are often scattered across rural areas. For this reason, 
                                                 
47 “Micro-Credit: A Weapon against Poverty.” Available on line at: www.indopubs.com/iri-1-
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banks rarely become involved in such operations. Therefore, many micro-credit 
organizations agreed that people must organize themselves to reduce the costs of the 
loans. Due to the high risks in this type of business, micro-credit organizations charge 
interest rates far higher than those of commercial banks.  
The amount of money that is in the informal sector and, therefore, out of 
the banking system, must also serve the formal Senegalese economy through an 
intelligent and fair system that can make people willing to put their savings in banks. 
Such a policy will improve the overall economy by raising investment and production. 
2. The Informal Sector and the Tax System 
One of the reform measures in Senegalese economics is to expand the tax base 
and increase tax revenues. For example, in the fiscal year 1998 budget, the total revenue 
was estimated at Franc Cfa 516.8 billion (US$ 861 million), a decrease of 3.1% 
compared to the 1997 budget. In 1998, taxes represented Franc Cfa 442 billion (US$ 
736.6 million) of the 1998 budget. This was an increase of 10.1% compared to 1997. The 
1998 taxes were Franc Cfa 11 billion in income tax, Franc Cfa 9 billion in custom duties, 
and Franc Cfa 22.5 billion in value added tax. 48 The Senegalese government has 
implemented many laws to simplify the taxation of small enterprises and to reach the 
maximum number of taxpayers in the informal sector. While operating businesses, many 
people in the informal sector benefit from public investment in security, highways and 
other public utilities without paying taxes. According to Charbel Zarour’s report on the 
Senegalese informal sector (USAID/Senegal-Report on the Informal Sector in Dakar. 
August 1989),49 14.5% of the informal enterprises are known by the official 
administration, and only 25.8% of these enterprises pay their taxes (See table 7 below). 
These taxes were those that were collected at the work place, such as license taxes or 
indirect taxes (stamps or service taxes). Moreover, 97.5% of the informal sector does not 
use an accounting system for its business operations. Therefore, even a flat income tax 
would be difficult to apply to these enterprises. Nevertheless, according to Zarour’s 
survey, 82% of these enterprises have expressed their need to become familiar with the 
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administrative rules in order to conduct business legally. The more the government taxes 
these informal activities, however, the greater will be the discouragement to economic 
growth. 
 














· Production    
Cloth 25 104 24.0 
Wood 27 118 22.9 
Metal 37 125 29.6 
· Services    
Vehicle 
maintenance 35 96 36.5 
Electric 
maintenance 10 67 14.9 
Other Services 5 23 21.7 
· Construction    
Piece-Work 5 25 20.0 
Total 144 558 25.8 
 
From: USAID Senegal Report on the Informal Sector. August 1989, p. 148. 
Errors in the table above are due to rounding. 
       
D. THE INFORMAL SECTOR: FRAUD AND CORRUPTION ISSUES 
Fraud and corruption obviously undermine efforts to implement reforms for 
growth and development. Jean Bonvin, the President of the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) asserted that fraud and corruption divert human 
and capital resources from productive activities, undermining both the state and its 
institutions. Fraud and corruption seriously affect public savings, and consequently 
growth is hampered because part of the potential investment is not used to develop the 
country. In Senegal, reforms have been adopted to allow the fiscal administration to 
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lower fiscal fraud in order to improve growth and development. For example, import 
taxation has been lowered on many products susceptible to fraud in order to reduce the 
incentives to engage in fraud and corruption. Non-tariff barriers, which consisted mainly 
of import licenses that were delivered selectively to the importers by the administration, 
were used to protect certain Senegalese enterprises from the external competition. They 
were eliminated because Senegalese operators who could not obtain import licenses or 
afford high custom duties engaged in fraud and corruption in order to lower the prices of 
their products and be competitive.  
In their technical paper on “Determinants of Custom Fraud and Corruption: 
Evidence from Two African Countries,” David Strasvage and Cecile Dombree made an 
econometric test of the determinants of fraud in Senegal. 50 They measured the fraud in 
the customs office. To know how fraud can occur in the process of importing goods in 
Senegal, it is important to understand standard procedures for taxation of imports in 
Senegal. As mentioned in Chapter II and explained by Strasvage and Daubree, in 
Senegal, those who import goods must declare the value and describe their goods and, 
based on this declaration, a customs official verifies the tariff classification of the 
imported goods and calculates the tax. This calculation is based on the tariff classification 
of the product and on any exemptions, which may be accorded. This process of assessing 
taxes for import goods is known as “assessment.” Once the import taxes are calculated, 
the importers are required to pay the taxes owed to the Senegalese Treasury.  In Senegal, 
as in many African Countries, a private “pre-shipment inspection” company has been 
added to the process of taxation. In Senegal this pre-shipment company is called “Societe 
Generale de Surveillance (SGS).” The Societe Generale de Surveillance inspects any 
shipment in its country of origin in order to recommend a value and tariff classification. 
Also, the Société Générale of Surveillance can be mandated to conduct a follow-up check 
to verify if its recommendations have been followed. The Société Générale of 
Surveillance has been mandated to fight against such fraud as false declarations of values 
of imported products. 
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“Determinants of Customs Fraud and Corruption: Evidence from Two Countries.” August 1998. Available  
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As Strasvage and Daubree discuss, there are many opportunities to engage in 
fraud when the customs employees assess the import taxes. These opportunities include: 
· Under-declaration of the true value of the imported goods; 
· Misclassification of the imported goods tariff category; 
· Correct declaration of the imported products’ value and tariff 
classification but underpayment of import taxes based on a false 
assessment of tax liability; 
· Tax evasion when taxes are correctly assessed but never paid and the 
goods are released by the customs office anyway; 
· Smuggling without the knowledge of customs officials. 
Under-declaration, misclassification, and tax evasion have been the most 
recurrent modes of fraud in Senegal. Strasvage and Daubree showed that the rate of 
assessment, which is simply the total value of import tax assessments divided by the total 
declared value of imports, has been in a sharp decline since 1993. This could be the result 
of trade liberalization or an increase in fraud (See table below). 
 
Table 8.   Overall Import Statistics for Senegal (Billion of Cfa). 
 
 




309.4 333.1 281.9 390.7 691.1 
Import Tax 
Assessment 112.8 172.2 103.0 126.8 163.4 
Rate of 
Assessment 36.45% 51.69% 36.53% 32.45% 23.64% 
 
From: IMF, Direction des Douanes du Senegal, World Bank, Dakar. 
 
To determine fraud on imported goods, Strasvage and Daubree looked at statistics 
on individual products, in particular those products that frequently entered Senegal 
fraudulently. Sixty products were identified as susceptible to fraud. These sixty products 
include consumer goods, such as milk products, rice, tomato concentrate and matches. 
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These sixty products represent 19% of the total value of imports, on average, for the 
period 1990 to 1995. The rates of assessment on these sixty products “sensitive” to fraud 
have, on average, increased at the same time that official rates of taxation have been 
reduced.  What likely happened can be illustrated with a numerical example.  Assume 
that the rate of taxation is 20 percent and that, at that rate, a number of importers 
smuggle. Then, although the importers import, say, 10,000 cases of matches, they declare 
only 4,000 cases.  So the rate of assessment, that is, taxes actually paid as a percent of the 
value of all matches imported, legal or illegal, is only 8 percent.  Then assume that the 
government cuts the tax rate to 10 percent. At this lower tariff, some people who 
smuggled decide that the risks of smuggling are not worth bearing to avoid a 10 percent 
tax. So now 12,000 cases of matches are imported, of which only, say, 2,000 are 
smuggled.  So now the rate of assessment, that is taxes as a percent of the value of all 
matches imported, has actually risen to 8.33 percent (10% of 10,000 divided by 12,000).  
Decreased taxes are efficient solutions for decreasing fraud and corruption. Based on this 
data, Strasvage and Daubree have shown that the indicator for fraud, which is the gap 
between the official rates of taxation and the actual rates of assessment, has dropped from 
21% in 1990 to 3.2% in 1995. This indicated that fraud on these products has been 
reduced in Senegal. After examining the gap between the rates of assessment computed 
in table 8 and the official rate of taxation, Strasvage and Daubree concluded that: 
· Increases in import taxes have led to increased fraud and corruption in 
Senegal; 
· The pre-shipment inspection, SGS, has contributed to decreased fraud; 
· The devaluation of the Cfa appears to have been associated with an 
increase in fraud. In fact, imported products have become expensive, so 
importers have relied on fraud or corruption to decrease their costs; 
· Market liberalization reduced the incentives to engage in fraud and 
corruption.  
This evidence suggests that to reduce fraud in the import of goods to Senegal, the 
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IV. POLICIES TO IMPROVE SENEGALESE ECONOMIC 
REFORMS  
A. GOVERNMENT AND PARTNERS’ RELATIONSHIPS 
Seemingly, the government, the World Bank, the IMF, and so on, when reforming 
the Senegalese economy did not discuss all the factors, such as the political and social 
constraints that the Senegalese government would face. The Senegal economic reform 
has been ongoing for more than twenty years without fully attaining its objectives. 
Although, in 1981, the Senegalese President was ambitious about economic reforms, but 
the reform process has not reached its objectives. This situation was due to many 
reasons.51 First of all, there was a lack of political will resulting from fear of electoral 
defeat and societal pressures. Also, the peasants were unable to sell their peanuts after 
private traders replaced the SONAGRAINES. What happened was the banks financed the 
private traders, who then simply used the money for more profitable investments than 
groundnuts. The Senegalese President reported that the IMF and the World Bank were 
responsible because they wanted SONAGRAINES eliminated without ensuring about 
reliable private traders to replace it.52  Finally, some of the political elites, such as 
Ministers or Parliaments who were supposed to support the economic reforms decided by 
the Senegalese President, were convinced that the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank policy recommendations were inappropriate for the country. 
The Senegalese government was involved in economic reforms without fully 
explaining the content of the reforms to the Senegalese people. Instead of testing the 
credibility of the reforms, the Senegalese regime should have included the economic 
reform proposal in its campaign to assess its popularity before engaging in it. In addition, 
most members of the political elite, the private sector and the Senegalese people were 
poorly informed of the strategies and objectives of economic reforms. People feared the 
reforms would benefit the richest and harm the poorest. Most Senegalese equate reforms 
with layoffs, inflation, and a decrease in spending power. They appreciated reforms only 
                                                 
51 See: “Voting for Reform,” p. 292. 
52 1. See: “Wal Fadjiri” newspaper, March 4, 2002”. Available on line at: 
www.walf.sn/politique/index.CFM?articles_num=7866 and 2. See: Sud Quotidian newspaper, March 4, 
2002. Available on line at: www.sudonline.sn/Rubriques%201Infos/Economie/econo2.htm.     
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when the immediate effects were evident. Moreover, sometimes members of the IMF and 
World Bank teams who negotiate with the political elite do not fully comprehend African 
realities, so they cannot make reasonable recommendations on how to improve the 
economies of these nations.  In order to implement the reform process successfully, all 
parties, the Senegalese government, the IMF, and the World Bank must overcome the 
aforementioned obstacles. The terms of the reform process must be included in political 
programs and fully disseminated to gain popular credibility and confidence. The IMF and 
the World Bank delegation from Washington must consider the sensitive aspects of 
African realities in order to deal with economic reforms in Africa. People in local IMF 
and World Bank agencies who know the African countries’ realities because they practice 
on the terrain on a daily basis must be strongly involved in the negotiations undertaken 
with local governments. This can help to make efficient recommendations to reform the 
economies.  
B. WHAT CAN BE DONE FOR THE MILITARY? 
The Senegalese military is a professional organization that has not engaged in war 
since the country gained its independence. The military was engaged in only two 
significant external interventions. One was in Gambia in 1981, where a communist 
regime was about to be installed by a rebel group that intended to conduct a coup d’état. 
The second was in Guinea Bissau in 1998, where a mutiny took place, and thereafter, a 
witch-hunt was conducted to identify those in the Guinea Bissau military who supported 
the Casamance rebellion against Senegal. To avoid bloodshed in Guinea Bissau, to 
protect democracy and to cut supply lines to the rebels in Republic of Guinea Bissau, the 
Senegalese military intervened in Guinea Bissau.  Aside from these two events, the 
Senegalese military is still fighting the rebellion in Casamance and the Senegalese 
government is paying dearly for it. Despite the relative ease of portraying the rebellion in 
ethnic terms, the origins of the conflict in the southern Senegalese region of Casamance 
between secessionist guerrillas and state security forces are largely economic and 
political in nature. Since 1982, the Senegalese government endured the military and 
financial cost of fighting and overcoming the Casamance rebellion that is paralyzing what 
used to be one of the country's most fertile agricultural zones.  
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In addition to the effort to fight the Casamance rebellion, the Senegalese military 
is engaged in UN missions and is also engaged in various government missions within 
the country. The Senegal military has many medical experts, engineers, and other kinds 
of experts. In accordance with the economic adjustments and the size of the country, the 
Senegalese military can be reformed through these measures:  
· Define the exact military personnel and materiel necessary to secure the 
Casamance and help eradicate the rebellion in this area. This is very 
feasible since the war against the rebellion has been going on for more 
than twenty years, proving that only a political solution can be applied to 
the situation;  
· Reduce the budget by military downsizing.  
In fact, the rebellion in Casamance represents a significant cost for the Senegalese 
government in military expenditures and also in agricultural waste since the Casamance 
fertile lands cannot be exploited. Therefore, the government must undertake political and 
military efforts to safeguard the Casamance people but also to end the rebellion in order 
to make the Casamance lands economically profitable for the Senegalese and provide 
other economic opportunities.  
Military personnel expend itures (total military pay = 34.1 billions Francs Cfa) 
represented 20% of the total Senegalese pay for government workers in 1995 and 82% of 
the overall military budget (the military budget = 41.4 billions Francs Cfa)53 for the same 
year. For the 2001 fiscal budget, military personnel expenditures were approximately 
39.5 billions Francs Cfa, which represented 22% of the Senegalese government pay for 
2001 and 76% of the overall military budget for fiscal year 2001. These statistics indicate 
that the Senegalese military personnel expenditures are very high relative to the military 
missions needed and to the level of underdevelopment of the country. Therefore, the 
Senegalese government can initiate a voluntary departure program for the military to save 
money. Military experts who are willing to leave and become involved in businesses can 
contribute to improve the Senegalese economy. After reforming the military, Senegal can 
develop a disciplined and high quality defense force to enhance the security of the 
country (Nadir A.L. Mohammed. 1999, p. 13). Reducing military expenditures can help 
                                                 
53 Senegalese fiscal year 1995 budget. 
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to decrease government taxes by about the same amount in order to improve private 
savings and investments.  
C. REDUCTION OF INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES 
In their paper on the informal sector, “Firm Dynamics and Institutional 
Participation,” July 20, 1998, Alec R. Levenson and William F. Maloney explain how 
being formal can improve production. Maloney and Lewenson point out that some 
contributions to the academic literature emphasize the firms’ desires to avoid paying 
taxes, regulations or other state controls (Loayza, 1995). Other contributions see the 
inability to access institutions, such as those securing property rights, as hampering firm 
growth (De Soto, 1989). The two authors ment ion that these views are valid as special 
cases of a more general and continuous relation between the firm and the society. 
Maloney and Levenson argue that a minimal degree of participation in some institutions 
is a necessary input to growth for many firms and that participation increases with the 
success of the business. They use the standard production function that integrates capital 
(K) and labor (L), and introduce participation (P), a normal input to production and 
defined as participation in societal institutions. In the equation, all three inputs are 
complementary. Then, the equation is written as follows: Q= F (L, K, P). Based on this 
equation, Maloney and Lewenson point out three main benefits of participation. 
All entrepreneurs have access to social relationships to enforce implicit contracts 
among their friends and family, who form their potential customers and employees. 
Participation in the legal system is needlessly expensive for transactions. Similarly, the 
mutual extended network of friends and family, as it exists in the informal sector, may 
handle social expenditures such as health insurance. However, personal relations sustain 
this mode of operation with all involved parties, which is unmanageable when the 
business expands. Legal participation in institutions facilitates making long-term 
commitments, diminishes risk, and can reduce monitoring costs. 
Informal capital markets may be sufficient to fulfill the firm’s external financing 
needs at low levels of production. However, the small scale and undiversified nature of 
the informal capital market makes them unsuitable to meet the financing needs on a 
grander scale of operation. When the firm expands, it will turn to formal institutions like 
banks. 
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If the firm wants to attract well-qualified and quality workers, it has to ensure that 
its employees have health insurance, pensions and so forth. Incentive policies must be 
implemented for the informal sector to become involved in participation in institutions. 
Non-governmental organizations and many development partners have implemented 
many educational and financing programs in the informal sector.  
Whatever these benefits, participation must be the enterprise’s own decision. It is 
highly important to avoid any regulation that forces the informal sector to participate.  It 
was noted earlier that, in Senegal, the attempt to involve the informal sector in numerous 
institutions of civil society, federal and local treasuries, governmental programs 
(pensions, health care), the legal system, the banking system, health inspection, trade 
organization and so on was a failure. The informal sector is generally a stage that satisfies 
its people with a little degree of participation or not at all. Therefore, forcing participation 
for the informal sector would be a way to eliminate it. How much to participate in 
institutions should result from a free decision of the entrepreneurs. 
The adjustment and structural reforms must integrate pertinent measures that 
avoid regulating and involving the informal sector in institutions. However, incentive 
policies can be made to encourage the informal sector to eliminate the constraints to its 
development and to follow a natural process that leads to decisions of how it should 
participate.  
D. EDUCATION ISSUES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
Most people in the informal sector have low levels of education and literacy since 
many of them are school dropouts or are educated and literate only in Arabic. This latter 
situation is complicated by the fact that anything official in Senegal is in French. 
In fact, Senegal was colonized by France and inherited the French official 
administrative system and language. Therefore, in order to deal with the official 
institutions, basic literacy in French is useful. A survey of people in the informal sector 
found that of 558 entrepreneurs sampled in the informal sector, 430 agreed to give 
information on their level of education. Of these 430 entrepreneurs, 22.1% were illiterate, 
34.7% were literate in French, and 43.2% is literate mainly in Arabic (Zarour, 1989, p. 
95). The level of education and literacy in French is too low to allow people in the 
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informal sector to understand fully how to deal with the official administrative agencies. 
Most informal entrepreneurs have a high level of education and literacy in Arabic, but 
this is not helpful in dealing with the official agencies using French. This is a major 
obstacle to participating in institutions. In my opinion, the incentive policy to remove 
obstacles due to the low level of education and literacy in the informal sector can be 
designed around the propositions that follow 
· The government can hire people who are well educated and literate in 
French, Wolof, and Arabic to facilitate contacts between those in the 
informal sector who are educated and literate in Wolof and Arabic  
· Officially recognizing the level of training in the informal sector through 
official diplomas can make skills and experience acquired in the sector a 
valuable incentive to deal with institutions and to benefit from them.  
The policy can be designed around many other incentives to help the informal 
sector work with institutions.  
E. CREDIT POLICY FOR THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
We have already observed how the lack of credit inhibits growth in the informal 
sector. The survey cited in the Senegalese Ministry of Trade preparatory report on the 
informal sector shows that:  
· In the informal sector, 93.80% of the people have never borrowed money 
from banks, and only 12% of enterprise promoters have borrowed money 
from banks. This weak percentage of borrowers is due to the banking 
criteria, such as financial guaranties or collateral that sometimes unable 
the informal sector to take financial risks. For example, although 79.83% 
of the people in the informal sector can afford the financial guaranties and 
collateral they do not want to take financial risks because of their high 
amounts, and 30% cannot apply for credit because of lack of money;  
· In the informal sector, 50% of the people claim that applying for banking 
credit is not necessary. Also, 68% rely on their own funds to run their 
businesses, 18% of them received funds from parents or friends, 3% used 
tontines or other similar structures, 10% used mutual financial 
associations, and 1% used other financial sources; 
· As for informal enterprises that have obtained credits, 12% have obtained 
credits from the banking system, 25% from Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO), and 63% from the decentralized financial system, 
such as mutual financial associations. 
It appears from the survey cited by the Senegalese Ministry of Trade report on the 
credit issues of the informal sector that people rely mostly on financial sources other than 
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banks. The multitude of NGO that have succeeded in the informal communities and have 
replaced banks have unfortunately very high interest rates that are necessary to cover 
their costs. The best incentive policy is to deregulate the financing market. In so doing, 
competition between credit organizations would allow decreased interest rates and the 
liberalization of the financing market that would derive from the deregulation would 
promote tontines and other informal ways for financing businesses.  
F. POLICY AGAINST FRAUD AND CORRUPTION 
Fraud and corruption carry high political, economic, and social costs. The 
economic reforms implemented in Senegal have substantially decreased fraud and 
corruption. Deregulation of the economy, in areas such as market liberalization and 
privatization, has played an important role in combating fraud and corruption. Very 
recently, Wal Fadjiri, a Senegalese newspaper, reported on a survey conducted by a 
Senegalese civil society organization called “FORUM CIVIL” through “Orgatec,” a 
survey organization.  
The Orgatec survey reported that traffic police and customs officers are the two 
most corrupt groups in the Senegalese administration. Based on samples of 396 
Senegalese enterprises and 1,227 important people, the survey shows that 72.2% of 
businessmen and 53.3% of individuals say that police personnel are more corrupt than the 
other Senegalese government personnel. As for the customs, the data for the same 
samples are respectively 63.9% and 55%.54. The customs chief executive rejected the 
Orgatec survey results, labeling them as erroneous and motivated by politics. He argued 
that the tools used for the survey are not reliable.55 This controversy shows the presence 
of corruption in the country.  Thus, since it is so important to combat fraud and 
corruption, the Senegalese government must show more determination to advance the 
economic reforms process and to eliminate corruption in the country. Decreasing custom 
duties can help to diminish fraud. During many meetings of Senegalese government 
agencies, businessmen argued that fraud and corruption could be substantially reduced if 
                                                 
54 See: “Wal Fadjiri” newspaper of May 16, 2002. Available at: www.walf.sn/actualite/index.CFM 
?articles_num=9460. 
55 See: Wal Fadjiri newspaper of May 18, 2002. 
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custom duties are significantly decreased. They also said that they were willing to pay 
additional taxes if corruption were eliminated.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The economic reforms in Senegal were fully implemented during and after the 
devaluation of 1994. A series of programs of adjustments and economic reform were 
aimed at restoring the conditions for strong, sustainable economic growth and ensuring 
domestic and external financial viability. These programs were supposed to reduce 
inflation and the deficit quickly, and also included wide-ranging structural reforms aimed 
at liberalizing the economy, reducing the size of the public sector, and fostering the 
private sector development. The programs were intended to increase the standard of 
living of the most disadvantaged social groups. Therefore, these programs allowed 
changes that enabled those in the informal sector to obtain the opportunities and 
advantages of free trade. The programs focused on 
· Eliminating barriers to free domestic trade; 
· Eliminating the requirement that importers get licenses to import goods 
that compete with domestically produced goods; 
· Eliminating export subsidies; 
· Eliminating monopolistic agreements; 
· Privatizing major public enterprises; 
· Eliminating the need for business to consult government before laying off 
workers. 
These measures are on the brink of reaching the objectives of the economic 
reforms process, such as free trade and free business, in order to increase growth and to 
reduce poverty. The negative effects of these measures on employment, on wages, and on 
poverty are likely only transitory; naturally, much time is required to affect the entire 
economy positively. The economic reforms definitely decreased fraud and corruption, 
decreased government participation in the economy, increased economic freedom, and 
improved the macroeconomy. In fact, the Senegalese real GDP growth surpassed 5% on 
average between 1996 and 1998, driven essentially by services, construction and 
industrial production. Along the same lines, inflation decreased from 2.6% in 1996 to 
1.8% in 1997 and 1.1% in 1998. Also, the current account deficit as a percentage of the 
GDP decreased from 7.8% in 1997 to 6.8% in 1998 (Senegal: Economic and Financial 
Policy Framework Paper 1999-2001). However, after more than twenty years of 
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economic reforms, the objectives of fixing the economy were not fully reached. These 
failures were due to the fact that the government still intrudes in the economy, and to the 
fact that the confidence of Senegalese people in economic reforms has never been fully 
tested in political campaigns. Ano ther failure is related to unwillingness of the World 
Bank and the IMF to negotiate firmly with government leaders.  
As the result of the reform process, the informal sector grew and refused to be 
marginalized. Without trying to regulate its activities, the Senegalese government must 
create the conditions for enterprises in the informal sector to develop normally. Thus, the 
reform process must be fully implemented by deregulating the economy. All roadblocks 
such as non-tariff barriers, increased customs taxes, regulation of finance markets, and so 
on must be eliminated to create a free economy that would allow the informal sector to 
grow. 
As for the military, the economic reforms decreased the budget and the number of 
military personnel. Moreover, soldiers have been affected as consumers by having to face 
the daily economic crisis of inflation and a decrease in their spending power. The military 
budget cuts also decreased military materiel maintenance and the soldier’s personal 





APPENDIX A.  OFFICES AND DOCUMENTS REQUESTED OR 
DELIVERED FOR IMPORTATION OR EXPORTATION 
OPERATIONS 












Protection of the Vegetation 
· Prior Authorizations for Import of Pesticide 
· Sanitary Certificate of Goods Imported 
· Report of Sanitary Check on Imported Goods 
Veterinary 
· Veterinary Certificate for Animal Products to be 
Consumed or Used by the Industry 
· Veterinary Certificate for any Kind of Animal 
Imported 
Oceanography & Fishing 
· Sanitary Certificate for Sea Products from 
Europe & Africa 
· Certificate of No Radioactivity 
Quality of Products  · Certificate for the Quality of Products Imported 
Metrology · Attestation of Declaration of Measurement 
Instruments 
Foreign Trade · Certificate of Origin of the Product Imported 
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APPENDIX B.  THE PATH TO SET UP A FORMAL ENTERPRISE  
 
From: Foreign Investment Adviser Service (FIAS). Report on Senegal: Le Parcours de 
L’Investisseur (Investor’s Path). March 1999. 
 
Each arrow indicates a contact that an investor has with a given office. The shows 
that an investor can have more than one contact with a given office for the same request 
or for a different request in order to be qualified.  
African 
Organization 













Submits same 12 documents to 13 public 
agencies. 
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APPENDIX C.  SENEGAL: SUMMARY AND TIMETABLE OF 
MACROECONOMIC AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
MEASURES, 1998-2000 

















Achieve fiscal savings 
of around 6.5% of 
GDP in 2000. 
1998 to 2000 
 
 
1998 to 2000 
 
1.  Revenue 
Continue reform 
of the tax system 
to expand the tax 
base and improve 
its yield. 
Introduce an external 
tariff consistent with 
WAEMU's common 
external tariff policy 
objectives. 





Introduce a four-tier 
tariff structure, 
exclusive of a customs 
stamp (0, 5, 10 and 
25%) 
April 1998  
  




with four rates. 
July 1998  
  
Define the terms of 
application of the 
surtaxes, in 
accordance with the 
decisions taken within 
the WAEMU. 
July 1998  
  
Reform petroleum 
taxation (see section F 
below) 
April 1998  
  
Align the rates of the 
VAT collected at the 
border to the rates set 
out in the Tax Code. 
April 1998  
  
Strengthen the 





computerization of the 
VAT administration. 
1998  
  Expand the use of the 1998  
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identification numb er 
system 








1998 to 2000  
  Prepare a study on the 
possible adoption of a 
single VAT rate. 
July 1998  
  Eliminate the 
exemptions to customs 
duties and VAT 
collected by Customs. 
1998 to 1999  
  Prepare measures to 
simplify the taxation 
of small enterprises 
and better tax the 
informal sector. 
1998 to 1999  
  Continue 
implementation of the 
import inspection 
program (PVI). 
1998 to 1999  
  Connect the valuation 
database of the Société 
Générale de 
Surveillance (SGS) 
and the GAINDE 
system; improve the 
efficiency of the 
GAINDE system. 
1998  




countries and adopt a 
regional investment 
code. 
1998 to 2000  
  Eliminate the 
exceptional fiscal 
arrangements granted 
certain enterprises in 
the modern sector. 
1998 to 1999  
2. Current 
Expenditure 
Pursue a policy of 
controlling 
current 
Limit the number of 
civil servants to 
67,000, excluding 
















Implement the new 







budgetary needs of the 
Ministries of National 
Education, Health, and 
Justice based on the 






actuarial study of the 
National Pension Fund 
(FNR). 
By end of 1998 ILO 
  
Implement the 
institutional reform of 
the FNR. 
1999 to 2000 ILO 
  
Increase the share of 
expenditure allocated 
to the priority social 
sectors. 
1998 to 2000  
  
Prepare a report on the 
outline of the 
government's new 
budget programming 
approach and action 
plan to improve 
preparation of the 
investment budget. 
End of July 1998  
  
Strictly limit transfers 
and subsidies to public 
enterprises to the 
amounts specified in 
the budget; no longer 
grant subsidies to 
state-owned or 
semipublic companies. 
1998 to 2000  
  
Avoid any 
accumulation of extra 
budgetary arrears by 
stepping up control of 
expenditure 
commitment at the 
level of the single 
authorizing unit 
(Ministry of Economy, 
Finance and Planning). 
1998 to 2000  
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the public expenditure 
review conducted in 
1997 with the 
assistance of the 
World Bank. 


























indicators for the 
execution of the public 
investment program. 
1998 to 2000  
  
Submit the three-year 
rolling public 
investment program 
(PTIP) (1999-2001) to 
the World Bank for 
review. 
September 1998 World 
Bank 
  Adopt the 1999 to 2001 PTIP. Dec. 1998  
  
Ensure that recurrent 
project costs are taken 
into account. 









control of staffing 
levels. 
Update, computerize 
and standardize the 
three files (payroll, 
civil service, technical 
ministries) and make 
them consistent with 
the staffing plans of 














 Strengthen the personnel 
Update, computerize 















control of staffing 
levels. 
three files (payroll, 
civil service, technical 
ministries) and make 
them consistent with 
the staffing plans of 














Conduct a users' 
survey on the quality 






Organize a national 
debate on the quality 
of public services. 
July 1998  
  
Complete the transfer 
of responsibilities in 
the context of 
decentralization. 
1998 to 2000  
  




July 1998  
  
Prepare the national 
plan for good 
governance (PNBG) in 
regard to local and 
central governments. 





















Conduct audits of 





financial audits to 
define municipal 
adjustment programs. 













1998 to 2002 
World 
Bank 




service to a 
sustainable level. 
Limit new 
concessional loans to 
those entailing a grant 
element of at least 
35%. 
1998 to 2000  
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Make all government 
and government-
guaranteed borrowing 
subject to prior 
authorization by the 
Ministry of Economy, 
Finance and Planning. 
1998 to 2000  
  
Increase the staff of 
the unit responsible for 




Set up a system for 
monitoring domestic 
public debt. 
June 1998  
  
Clear any existing 
external payments 
arrears and avoid 
accumulation of new 
arrears 
1998 to 2000  
     
C. Public 
Enterprises 
Reduce the size of 
the public 
enterprise sector 
and enhance its 
efficiency. 
Complete execution of 
the public enterprise-
restructuring program 
by 2000 with a view to 
reducing the 
government's holdings 
to less than 25%, with 
the exception of a few 
enterprises (asset 
holding companies, 
training and promotion 
companies, and 
strategic enterprises 





privatization of SSPT, 
SPHU-TERANGA 
and SONADIS. 










Président hotel and 4 
small enterprises 
(SODIDA, MSAD, 
HAMO and SONEPI). 
By end of December 
1998  
  Privatize SENELEC: launching of bids. August 1998  
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Adopt a new strategy 
for the privatization of 
SONACOS (see G 
below). 
July 1998  
  
Strengthen the unit in 
charge of managing 
the government 
portfolio. 
1998 to 99 World Bank 
  




1998 to 2000  
  
Present a report on the 
economic and 
financial results in 
1996 of the 37 
enterprises in which 
the government has a 
majority holding. 
End of July 1998  







Design a credit 
policy consistent 









Develop the secondary 
markets in treasury 
bills and central bank 
paper. 




1998 to 2000 
 
  
Limit access of 










Submit a law to the 
National Assembly 
amending the system 




programs to strengthen 










enforce the prudential 
ratios established by 
the regional banking 
commission strictly. 




bank audits in 
progress. 
1998 to 2000  
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financing and access 
to technical assistance 
for small and medium-
sized companies. 
1998 to 2000 IFC 
  
Analyze the 
conclusions of the 
rural credit studies 
conducted in 1997 




Strengthen the unit at 
the Ministry of 
Economy, Finance and 
Planning responsible 
for supervisory mutual 





of commercial courts 
and procedures to 















(especially leasing and 
venture capital). 
December 1998  
  
Implement the text s 
regulating the regional 






Begin offering shares 
in partially privatized 













sector activity and 
reduce distortions. 
Continue liberalization 
of domestic and 
foreign trade and of 
the pricing system. 
Promote respect of the 
rules of competition. 





1998 to 2000 
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Improve the legal 
environment and 
the performance 
of the judicial 
system. 
Undertake an 
assessment of the 
results of measures 














Have the National 
Assembly adopt new 
measures regarding 
arbitration, enterprises 
in difficulty and 
paralegals. 
Next session of the 
National Assembly  




allocated to the 
administration of 
justice. 







Study options for the 
gradual liberalization 
of capital flows. 
Develop a plan to 
improve institutional 


























Liberalize the import, 
transportation, and 
distribution of 
petroleum products  
(including third-party 
access to import, 
storage, and transport 
facilities). 
Abolish the US$ 2.3 
SAR supplement per 
barrel and replace the 
special agreement for 
the SAR by a 
temporary, declining 
















Adopt a tariff 
structure, which 
entails a twenty 
April 1998  
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white products and 
crude oil and 5 points 
on black products. 
  
Adjust this structure 
downward in line with 
the WAEMU tariff 
convergence program 
and reduce the 
differential to fifteen 
percent age points for 
white products. 
January 1, 2000  
  
Eliminate the implicit 
subsidies on black 
products sold for 
electricity generation 
over three years 
(1998-2001); on 
butane over four years 
(1998-2002). 
1998 to 2002  
  
Replace the variable 
stabilization levy with 
a specific tax on white 
products. 
April 1998  
  
Adopt a new price 




monthly) of domestic 
sale prices. 
April 1998  
  
Continue to execute 
privatization plan for 
SENELEC. 
1998 to 1999  
  






April 1998  
  
Transfer of legal 
ownership of Senegal's 
electricity transport 
and distribution 
infrastructure from the 
State to SENELEC. 
April 1998  
  
Launching of bids for 
privatization of 
SENELEC 
August 1998  
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oversight to strategic 
partner. 
End 1998  
  
Sell of shares to 
SENELEC workers 
and other private 
sector operators; 
reduction of state 
ownership to no more 
than 41%. 
Before April 1999  
  Liberalize charcoal and wood fuel prices. End-1999  
  
Implement the 
provisions of the new 
forestry Code. 






security by means 
of diversified and 
competitive local 
production. 
Finalization of an 
operational strategy 
document 
Provide support and 
advice to farmers 
Strengthen agricultural 
research and extension 
services; 
Enhance the role of 
producer organizations 
in the development of 
the agricultural sector; 
Implement a viable 







1998 to 2000 
 
 








Revise the land tenure 
legal context to ensure 
greater security of 





tools and means of 
action of the 
agricultural sector; 
restore soil fertility; 
restructure the 
fertilizer sub sector; 
improve access to 
quality seed varieties. 
1998 to 2000  
  
Finalize a priority 
investment program 
for the agricultural 
sector based on the 
agricultural 
December 1998  
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assessment of water 
needs. 
March 1998  
  
Consolidate the 
operations of the 
Program for the 
Development of the 






saving programs in 
irrigated areas. 
1998 to 2000  
  
Establish the Higher 
Council on Water and 
the Water Technical 
Committee. 
1998  
 Groundnut sector 
Privatize SONACOS: 
Define a strategy; 
Select a reference 
partner. 
June 1998 
December 1998  
 Cotton sector 
Maintain the free 
determination of the 
sale price of fiber to 
local textile mills. 
1998 to 2000  
  







procedures for exports. 
1998 World Bank 
  
Introduce a system of 
standardization of fruit 
and vegetable quality. 
1998  
 Livestock 
Pursue privatization of 
SODESP and 
veterinary medicine. 
1998 to 99  
  
Pursue the 
development of animal 
production. 
1998 to 2000  
  
Promote exports from 
the leather and skins 
sub sector. 
1998 to 2000  
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Finalize the fisheries 
development master 
plan. 
June 1998  
  
Ensure that the new 
fishing code for the 
conservation and 
rational use of fish 
resources is adopted. 
December 1998  
  
Complete the 
privatization of fishing 
equipment. 
1998 to 2000  







infrastructure to open 
Senegal up from its 
land-locked position 
within the WAEMU 
(roads, railroads, ports, 
airports). 
1998 to 2000  
  
Improve the 
competitiveness of the 
Port of Dakar (keep 
personnel costs below 
30% of operating costs 
and billing periods to a 
maximum of three 
months). 
1998 to 2000 World Bank 
  
Privatization of the 
management of 
Senegal's airports: 
-Launching of studies; 


















 Develop a business 
plan for Air Senegal 












Adopt a legal and 
regulatory framework 
for the private 
 
 












operation of the Dakar 
Bamako international 
rail line; 
Create a joint 
Senegalese-Malian 
private management 
company for the Dakar 
Bamako international 
rail line (SETI); 







Design a program for 
improved management 




Reform the legal and 
operational framework 
of urban transportation 
for its complete 
liberalization. 
1998 to 2000  
 Mining sector. Adopt the revised Mining Code. December 1998  
  
Update and modernize 
the geological and 
cartographic database. 
1998  




    
1. Health 
Ensure better 




viability of the 
public health 
system. Reduce 
the fertility rate. 
Increase the share of 
current government 
expenditure on health 
care by at least 0.5% 
per year to reach the 
WHO standard of 9% 
by 2002. 
Sign the decree 
reorganizing the 
Ministry of Health and 
Social Action. 













recruitment plan for 
the Ministry of Health 
and Social Action with 
a target of recruiting 
250 staff per year (all 
categories combined). 
1998 to 2000  
  
Reduce the number of 
inhabitants per health 
center from about 
158,000 in 1997 to 
 
1998 to 2000  
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150,000 by 2000. 
  
Reduce the number of 
inhabitants per health 
post from around 
11,000 in 1997 to 
10,000 in 2000 
1998 to 2000  
  
Reduce deaths in 
childbirth by 25%, 
from 510 per 100,000 
births in 1997 to 380 
per 100,000 births in 
2002. 
1998 to 2002  
  
Begin research into the 
conditions for a 
sustainable solid 
financial footing for 
hospitals. 
March 1998  
  




(PNA), to provide 
more management 
autonomy. 
June 1998  
  
Increase immunization 
coverage from 60% in 
1997 to 80% by 2002. 
1998 to 2002  
  
Reduce the fertility 
index from 5.9 in 1997 
to 5.3 in 2000. 
1998 to 2000  
  
Promote the 
distribution and use of 
generic drugs. 




laboratories and the 
establishment of drug 
manufacturing 
facilities by the private 
sector. 
1998 to 2000  
  
Reform the statutory 
and regulatory 
framework of mutual 
health insurance 
organizations. 
1998 to 2000  
  
Rehabilitate private 
sector health insurance 
companies. 
1998 to 2000  
2. Population 
 
Control Continue to implement 1998 to 2000  
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from 9% in 1997 
to 16% in 2002). 
the program of priority 
actions related to 
population. 
Step up support to 
local governments for 
population control. 
Conclude the action 
program aimed at 



















from 59.7% in 
1997 to 70%  by 
2000 
Promote continued 
improvement in the 
quality of primary 
education and increase 
enrollment rates in 
rural areas, especially 
among girls. 
Gradually increase the 
share of current 
expenditure devoted to 
primary education. 













for girls from 
53% in 1997 to 
60% by 2000; 
Build and equip about 
1,500 primary 
classrooms annually 
and complete the 
ongoing classroom 
rehabilitation program. 
Annually recruit 1,500 
primary school 
teachers. 










rates in grades 5 
and 6 from 14% 
and 28%, 
respectively, in 
1997 to 10% and 
18% by 2000. 
Implement new 
regulations for 
primary school teacher 
training, recruitment, 
salaries, and career 
plans conducive to 
prima ry education for 
all. 
Rationalize higher 
education based on the 
conclusions of the 
PAES by gradually 
reducing its share in 
the education budget 
to 20.3% by 2000. 







1998 to 2000 
 
  
Involve students and 
businesses in 
financing the costs of 
vocational training. 
1998 to 2000  
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 Eliminate adult illiteracy. 
Increase the number of 
beneficiaries of 
literacy programs by 
20,000 a year (75% 
women) between 1997 
and 2000. 
1998 to 2000  








Implement a national 
plan for women and 
start implementation. 
Reduce the 



















to help the most-
disadvantaged social 
groups in accordance 
with the national 
poverty alleviation 
program adopted in 
December 1997. 
1998 to 2000 World Bank 
  
Increase the income of 
the poorest segments 
of the population by: 
-developing strategies 





























































especially in the 
infrastructure sector. 
1998 to 2000  







quality with a 
view to sustaining 
long-term 
economic growth. 
Have the government 
adopt the national 
environmental action 




























studies for all large 
investment projects. 
1998 to 2000  
  
Strengthen local-level 









1998 to 1999  
  










habitats, such as 
the Bay of Hann, 
Formulate and 
implement a coastal 
resources management 
program. 















Establish a system to 
facilitate solid waste 
management by local 
governments. 







Increase the resources 
set aside for the 
compilation of 
statistics, especially 
with regard to national 
accounts, foreign 
trade, and social 
indicators; continue to 
implement 
recommendations 
made in conjunction 
with past technical 
assistance; regularly 
publish available data. 
1998 to 2000  
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APPENDIX D.  MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR SENEGAL,  
1981-1990 (BILLIONS OF CURRENT CFA FRANCS) 




674 849 945 1,022 1,151 1,304 1,382 1,483 1,478 1,590 
Primary 
Sector 120 184 203 173 217 291 300 333 282 327 
Secondary 
Sector 107 127 146 174 205 228 247 273 272 292 
Tertiary 
Sector 
447 537 595 674 736 785 836 877 921 971 
Resource 
Balance -130 -104 -116 -97 -130 -71 -78 -75 -78 -64 
Imports (1) 347 395 427 484 474 416 423 448 474 474 
Exports (1) 216 291 311 387 344 346 346 373 396 410 
Net Official 
Transfers 48 60 60 61 60 61 64 61 72 75 
Fiscal Balance 
(2) -70 -77 -78 -54 -50 -47 -60 -64 -70 -8 
Expenditures 222 253 270 258 269 298 311 310 330 309 
Revenues 152 176 189 204 219 251 251 246 260 301 
78 
Indicators  1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 




11.9 11.3 11.9 11.7 9.8 11 11.7 12.5 10.8 12.7 
Fiscal Balance 
(3) -9.3 -8.7 -7.9 -5.0 -4.1 -3.5 -4.2 -4.4 -4.6 -0.5 
Resource 
Balance 19.3 -12.3 -12.3 
-9.5 -11.2 -5.4 -5.6 -5.0 -5.3 -4.0 
Imports (2) 51.4 46.5 45.2 47.4 40.9 31.9 30.6 30.2 32.1 29.8 














272 329 381 437 449 346 301 298 319 272 
Notes: Errors are due to rounding. 
1. Trade figures include goods and non-factor services. 
2. On cash basis, before debt rescheduling. Dates refer to fiscal (for example, 1981 refers to fiscal year 1981 to 
1982. 
3. Annual average 
4. Provisional estimate 
From: Estimates of the World Bank Staff; World Bank 1989a, 1989b; International 
Monetary Fund, Various Years 
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